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DARK SYSTEMS: REPROGRAMMING ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE FAIRNESS
AND EMPLOYMENT NONDISCRIMINATION

Robert Wennagel ∗
Automated decision-making (“ADM”) systems, whether
deploying artificial intelligence, machine learning, or other
algorithmic processes, have become ubiquitous in modern life, but
their use is often unnoticed or invisible to society at large. Currently
no federal laws require notice or disclosure to individuals when an
ADM is used to collect their data, evaluate them, or make
determinations about their lives. This is particularly concerning for
the employment relationship because notice and transparency are
essential for personal privacy, and the surreptitious use of ADM
systems deprives applicants and employees of the ability to understand
employers’ decision-making processes and to seek redress under
applicable antidiscrimination laws. Some state and local governments
have recognized this danger and have taken initial steps to protect
applicants and employees, while the European Union has proposed a
sweeping AI regulation that would govern all phases of development of
such systems there. This article proposes a system of regulations based
on notice and transparency that takes into consideration existing laws
governing the employment relationship and complements those laws in
order to produce a legal framework that promotes applicant and
employee rights, while also allowing flexibility for the development of
ADM systems that benefits employees, employers, and society.

LL.M., Drexel School of Law (2022); J.D., UCLA School of Law
(2005). I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Neal Wiley at Drexel, who
provided patient and wise guidance throughout the process of drafting this
Article. Special thanks to Janelle Barbier and the staff of Santa Clara High
Technology Law Journal for their consideration, editing acumen, and
providing a home for this work.
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INTRODUCTION

Automated decision-making (“ADM”) systems have become
ubiquitous, often without our knowledge as consumers, employees, and
citizens. For better or worse, they underpin processes such as the
advertisements we see, the loan terms for our cars and houses,
government benefits, college admission, and job applications. 1 The
systems have been steadily permeating daily operations in both
business and government, and this rise has only been hastened by the
growth of machine learning (“ML”) systems. From cradle to grave,
mathematical algorithms measure, track, categorize, and score people
based on often opaque formulas. Despite their promise, big data
analytics may threaten long-standing civil rights protections, and few
people understand such systems’ ubiquity or impact on their lives. 2
According to recent research, less than half of people were familiar
with the fact that a computer program may be solely responsible for
reviewing their job application. 3
Often classified by their marketers and proponents as artificial
intelligence (“AI”), modern systems actually bear little resemblance to
a “general artificial intelligence” that could act with common sense and
understanding equivalent to a human, and these modern systems also
suffer from several significant shortcomings. What they are good at what they are very good at - is the analysis of large amounts of data. 4
See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 673, 679 (2016); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS
DEMOCRACY 2 (2016); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2008) (exploring the use of automated
decision-making systems by governments and its due process implications);
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2014).
2
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES, at III (May 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_priva
cy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (finding that “big data analytics have the potential
to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in how personal information is
used in housing, credit, employment, health, education, and the marketplace”).
3
See Ifeoma Ajunwa, An Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring
Systems, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 621, 628–29 (2021); Aaron Smith & Monica
Anderson, Automation in Everyday Life, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/10/04/automation-in-everydaylife/.
4
Jeremias Adams-Prassl, What If Your Boss Was an Algorithm?
Economic Incentives, Legal Challenges, and the Rise of Artificial Intelligence
at Work, 41 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 123, 127–28 (2019); MELANIE
1
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For example, ADM systems have been adopted by employers to
evaluate large influxes of job applications and resumes. Many
companies use ADM systems that automatically review resumes and
produce scores correlating those job applicants to the required job
description without any human intervention. 5 More advanced systems
deploy machine learning systems to review available data and predict
whether applicants may be a successful fit at the target company.
These ADM systems have sometimes given rise to unfair hiring
practices or replicated historical discrimination, necessitating
abandonment of the projects altogether. 6 Faulty design or merely lack
of proper oversight can give rise to data correlations that ultimately
cause disparate impact discrimination even when the systems are
blinded and do not receive direct inputs regarding protected
information, such as race and gender. 7 For example, a system for
judging applicants may discover a job correlation between gaps in an
employee’s work history and low potential tenure at their new job. If
the ADM system weighed such gaps against an applicant, however, it
would have a disproportionately negative impact on protected
individuals who have a higher likelihood of taking leaves of absence or
temporarily leaving the workforce, such as people suffering from
disabilities, military service members, or women of child-bearing age.

MITCHELL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE FOR THINKING HUMANS 190–
94 (2019) (discussing Google’s Word2vec model, including the vast resources
drawn from and correlations it made for purposes of natural language
processing).
5
Ajunwa, supra note 3, at 626, 685–97 (surveying current products and
their automated features).
6
Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 857, 874 (2017); see also Ajunwa, supra note 3, at 635. Amazon
designed recruiting software that mirrored past patterns of sex discrimination
due to its workforce being primarily male. To its credit, after an investigation,
Amazon’s internal testing and validation discovered the problem and
cancelled the project; Alex C. Engler, Independent auditors are struggling to
hold AI companies accountable, FAST CO. (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90597594/ai-algorithm-auditing-hirevue;
Maya Oppenheim, Amazon Scraps ‘Sexist AI’ Recruitment Tool,
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/amazon-aisexist-recruitment-toolalgorithm-a8579161.html.
7
Allan G. King & Marko Mrkonich, “Big Data” and the Risk of
Employment Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2016); Woodrow
Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
81, 83 (2013) (reviewing how protected class information can be determined
from online data, such as social media).

6

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 39

Artificial intelligence also poses significant risks for employee
privacy. Machine learning systems and deep neural networks depend
on large amounts of training data to learn about the correlations
between various inputs and desired outputs. 8 For example, some
software developers and employers have exploited the explosion of
workplace data to develop and market products that use AI systems to
monitor employee behavior, even at those employees’ homes, without
providing notice or receiving consent for doing so. 9
Despite significant potential problems, the deployment of
artificial intelligence in the workplace has the potential to greatly
benefit employees, employers, and customers. There are tremendous
efficiency gains to be made. The management of large, heterogeneous
workforces is challenging for even the most skilled human resources
departments, but if artificial intelligence has proven anything, then it
has shown its ability to efficiently collect, sort, and evaluate vast
amounts of data. 10 Artificial intelligence systems may be deployed to
aid employee recruitment, scheduling and workforce management, and
employee performance management. 11
ADM systems, when used thoughtfully, may also promote
fairness and antidiscrimination. Employers may use algorithms to
make hiring and promotion decisions based on machine learning
criteria that carefully consider past historical injustices. 12 There are
numerous different models that may be applied to assist systems and
employers in evaluating whether AI practices promote fairness. 13
ADM systems and AI therefore hold both great promise and
the potential for significant, and often invisible, harm. When
automated decision-making systems invisibly replicate historical
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1, at 680.
See Zoë Corbyn, Bossware is coming for almost every worker: the
software you might not realize is watching you, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2022),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/apr/27/remote-worksoftware-home-surveillance-computer-monitoring-pandemic.
10
MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 214–21 (discussing IBM’s Watson and its
abilities related to natural language processing and performance on the quiz
show Jeopardy!); Jeremy Nunn, The Role Of AI Technologies In HR DataBased Decision Making, FORBES (July 3, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/07/03/the-role-ofai-technologies-in-hr-data-based-decision-making/?sh=222580a23f4e;
Citron, supra note 1, at 1252.
11
See infra, Section II.A.
12
Jason R. Bent, Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action Legal?, 108 GEO. L.J.
803, 805 (2020).
13
Doaa Abu-Elyounes, Contextual Fairness: A Legal and Policy Analysis
of Algorithmic Fairness, 2020 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2020).
8
9
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discrimination and bias, or when their inherent design limitations
promulgate other unfair treatment of employees, I refer to them as
“dark systems.” 14
At this time, the federal government in the United States has
not engaged in any systematic effort to regulate such AI or “dark
systems,” and there are no federal regulations in place that govern
employers’ collection or use of personal data through ADM systems. 15
Some cities and states have taken initial steps to evaluate and regulate
AI, but when doing so, they have not given adequate consideration to
the existing legislative framework and the unique problems found in
the employment context. 16 Instead, they mimic data privacy legislation
while ignoring the specific issues arising in employment in the United
States. 17 This privacy-centric approach emphasizes notice and
transparency, generally following the pattern of the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which requires data
controllers deploying automated decision-making technology to
provide data subjects with “meaningful information about the logic
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences
of such processing for the data subject.” 18 California, the first state to
pass a comprehensive data privacy regulation, plans to address ADM
systems as part of its corresponding data privacy regulations. 19
14
I have adopted this term because it seems a fitting parallel to the “dark
patterns” described in data privacy regulations and often deployed for online
marketing and e-commerce purposes. Dark patterns were first defined in 2010
as “a user interface carefully crafted to trick users into doing things they might
not otherwise do . . . with a solid understanding of human psychology, and
[which] do not have the user’s interests in mind.” Harry Brignull, Dark
Patterns: inside the interfaces designed to trick you, VERGE (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.theverge.com/2013/8/29/4640308/dark-patterns-insidetheinterfaces-designed-to-trick-you.
15
Ajunwa, supra note 3, at 623 (noting that when these employees are
deterred from even completing an application, such systems may “discreetly
and disproportionately cull the applications of job seekers who are from
legally protected classes”).
16
See infra, Section III.A.3.
17
See infra, Sections III.A.3 and III.B.2.
18
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art.
15(1)(h), 2016 O.J. (L 199) 1,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj [hereinafter “GDPR”].
19
California Privacy Rights Act, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807 (to be codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199.100 (effective Jan. 1, 2023)) [hereinafter
“CPRA”].
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At this time, however, only Illinois and New York City have
passed specific legislation addressing AI for employment purposes. 20
Illinois has sought to address the use of artificial intelligence when used
for evaluating applicants during video interviews, and New York City
has passed an ordinance that requires notice, the right to opt-out, and
independent audits whenever an ADM system is used for hiring or
promotional purposes.
Notice and transparency certainly benefit employee privacy,
and, if properly implemented for the employer-employee relationship,
could also significantly aid in the enforcement of existing
antidiscrimination laws in the United States. Unfortunately, data
privacy regulations do not fully address the unique problems of AI
when used in the workplace. 21 Early opt-out systems, such as those
contemplated by general data privacy laws and, in the case of the New
York City AI Ordinance, undermine the capabilities of machine
learning systems by depriving them of essential data necessary for
functioning and learning, replacing data which those systems may use
to improve their predictions with data biased due to self-selection. 22
Although such opt-out requirements may be intended to mitigate
potential algorithmic errors by incorporating a human in the loop, they
do so at an inappropriate time. Furthermore, without conveying any
specifics about the ADM systems, the data that they utilize, or how they
function, notification schemes also miss the opportunity to provide
applicants and employees the information that would potentially aid
them in identifying cases of disparate impact discrimination.
Likewise, current requirements for independent audits stand on
faulty premises. Where bought and paid for by AI developers and
employers, such audits have little chance of fairly evaluating or
remediating disparate impact discrimination. Unlike more wellestablished procedures for financial audits, no guidelines exist for how
AI audits should be performed. The contents and conclusions of any
such audit are therefore easily open to manipulation for financial and
commercial gain. Even if a regulator does provide proper guidelines,
however, auditing ADM systems in the development stage will likely
lead to significant gaps in understanding how they will behave once

See infra, Section III.A.3.
Automated decision-making systems, through both their use and their
access to private data, also carry cybersecurity risks, the potential for data
breaches, and the possibility of outright manipulation. As these concerns are
not unique to the employment context, however, they can likely be addressed
through more general regulations on data privacy and data breaches.
22
See infra, note 190.
20
21
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they are deployed to evaluate and make decisions about applicants and
employees in real-time and with real data.
Given the shortcomings with current legislation and
guidelines, this paper will propose regulatory protections that are
appropriately tailored to address how future legislation can most
effectively regulate ADM software in conjunction with existing data
privacy and antidiscrimination laws.23 Automated decision-making
software, when used in the employment context, should primarily be
transparent and subject to review by humans. With respect to
transparency, any time that an ADM system has been utilized to make
or assist in making an adverse employment decision, that use should be
disclosed to the affected applicant or employee, along with information
regarding what data was used for the system’s inputs, what decision or
output was produced by the ADM system, meaningful information
about how the system arrived at its decision or output, and basic
information about the ADM system such as its name and version. After
an adverse decision has been made and the requisite notice has been
provided, an applicant or employee should be provided the right to
request human review of the decision. This system of transparency and
human oversight will mitigate potential privacy issues, foster the
responsible development and deployment of ADM systems by
software developers and employers, encourage the timely review and
correction of faulty decisions, and assist applicants and employees in
enforcing their rights under existing antidiscrimination laws.

23
Although many scholars have argued that current antidiscrimination
laws, in particular the burden-shifting analysis under disparate impact
discrimination, will provide ineffective in evaluating artificial intelligence
decision-making, these claims are entirely speculative. No court has, as of
this writing, actually utilized the disparate impact discrimination framework
to evaluate an AI system in employment. Furthermore, courts have
historically proven their capability of adapting antidiscrimination standards to
meet the challenges of the times. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) (adopting the disparate impact discrimination theory). Many
scholars have also proposed methods of how antidiscrimination law can
effectively evaluate artificial intelligence systems. Kim, supra note 6, at 909–
36 (arguing that Title VII directly prohibits “classification bias”); Stephanie
Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 526 (2018)
(proposing an anti-stereotyping approach to algorithmic discrimination, and
stating that “stereotype theory allows [disparate treatment] to reach intentional
actions that incorporate or are infected by even unrecognized bias”).

10
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AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING, AI, AND MACHINE
LEARNING SYSTEMS
A.

Current Capabilities and Technology

ADM systems may be based on a variety of technologies,
including those currently available and those which have been
conceptualized but not realized by today’s technical capabilities. 24
General artificial intelligence, also known as broad artificial
intelligence, consists of yet-to-be realized systems that can emulate and
even improve upon a broad class of human capabilities and
intelligence. Despite many years of pursuit, such systems are likely
still many years away. 25 Current artificial intelligence, or “narrow
artificial intelligence,” is capable of a great deal, from beating the best
chess players in the world to high-frequency stock trading. 26 These
systems, however, lack fundamental human capacities such as common

24
This article will generally use the term automated decision-making
system and artificial intelligence interchangeably, although artificial
intelligence is only one method that an ADM system may incorporate. When
regulators have endeavored to define such terms, they have tended to pursue
technology-neutral definitions that are quite broad. The New York City
Ordinance uses the term “automated employment decision tool,” which it
defines as: “[A]ny computational process, derived from machine learning,
statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence, that issues
simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is
used to substantially assist or replace discretionary decision making for
making employment decisions that impact natural persons.” N.Y.C. MUN.
CODE § 20-870 (2022). The E.U. AI Proposal utilizes a similar definition. See
E.U. AI Proposal art. 3(1). (“‘[A]rtificial intelligence system’ (AI system)
means software that is developed with one or more of the techniques
[including machine learning, symbolic reasoning, or statistical approaches],
for a given set of human-defined objectives, generate outputs such as content,
predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing the environments they
interact with.”).
25
MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 46.
26
Id. at 245; Jack Kelly, Artificial Intelligence Is Superseding WellPaying
Wall
Street
Jobs,
FORTUNE
(Dec.
10,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/12/10/artificial-intelligence-issuperseding-well-paying-wall-street-jobs/?sh=7df3c57e524d.
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sense, the ability to reason by analogy, 27 understanding of context, 28
perceptive abilities tying them to the outside world, and transfer
learning. 29 The paradox recognized by AI researchers is that what is
easy for humans is hard for computers. 30 Without these abilities,
machine learning systems may be able to sort through and make deep
correlations between mountains of data that would take humans
lifetimes, but those same systems have persistent difficulties
addressing dynamic real-world scenarios that humans regularly face
and take for granted, such as driving cars in the rain or through heavily
trafficked roads while under construction. 31
Many of the current advancements and business applications
of artificial intelligence have emerged from a field called machine
learning. 32 Machine learning, or “ML,” generally refers to computer
programs, and in particular algorithms, that can improve through
experience and the use of voluminous sets of data. 33 Such programs
may be referred to as learning without being explicitly programmed to
do so. 34
Machine learning systems come in several varieties. Two of
the main subtypes are supervised and unsupervised systems. 35 A
GARY MARCUS & ERNEST DAVIS, REBOOTING AI: BUILDING
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WE CAN TRUST 62 (2019) (“In the end, deep
learning just ain’t that deep. It is important to recognize that, in the term deep
learning, the word ‘deep’ refers to the number of layers in a neural network
and nothing more. ‘Deep,’ in that context, doesn’t mean that the system has
learned anything particularly conceptually rich about the data it has seen.”).
28
MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 245.
29
Adams-Prassl, supra note 4, at 128 (noting that this may be referred to
as “Polanyi’s paradox,” after Michael Polanyi, who observed that “We know
more than we can tell”); MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 235–65.
30
MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 33 (quoting Marvin Minsky, Easy things
are hard).
31
Id. at 235–65, 267–70; MARCUS & DAVIS, supra note 27, at 149–79;
SEAN GERRISH, HOW SMART MACHINES THINK 37–56 (2018); Adams-Prassl,
supra note 4, at 128 (noting self-driving cars are distracted by environmental
hazards such as ice, snow, and faded road markings).
32
JERRY KAPLAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS
TO KNOW 31–43 (2016).
33
Id. at 27–28.
34
See A.L. Samuel, Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game
of Checkers. II - Recent Progress, 11 IBM J. 601, 601 (1967).
35
MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 103. Unsupervised and supervised systems
should be distinguished from reinforcement learning, which is often
successfully used as a method for machine learning systems to learn and play
games. These systems have enjoyed great success in mastering games with
constrained borders and defined parameters. A chess set, for example, has a
27

12
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supervised system typically learns through a process that is highly
monitored by computer scientists and software engineers. 36 All of
these real-world uses of machine learning systems require large
amounts of training data. 37 If a machine learning system is to be used
for predicting whether a job applicant will be a productive employee, a
company may feed human resources data into the system, and the
algorithms will then be able to make correlations between different data
points (inputs) in order to issue scores or associations (outputs) on
those candidates and their potential future job success. This same
process could theoretically be used throughout the employee life cycle
to predict employee turnover, potential for promotion, or when poor
performance may suggest the need for termination.
An unfortunate limitation on AI and machine learning
programs of this type, or of any current type, is that their training does
not give them the ability to effectively address or solve new
problems. 38 They lack what is commonly called transfer learning, or
the ability to understand common principles based on similar situations
or encounters. Whereas a child may play checkers and learn some
basic ideas of how to move and take their opponent’s pieces, which
could then be applied when learning chess, AI and ML programs have
not demonstrated this same innate human talent.39 Therefore, in the
employment context, an ADM system programmed to optimize the
selection of job candidates from certain job descriptions and past
performance data likely will need to be completely reprogrammed and
retrained for the evaluation of current employees based on their dayto-day performance metrics.
B.

The Shortcomings Inherent in Current AI and ML
Models
1.

Intentional Discrimination

Although it may be overlooked, artificial intelligence and
machine learning deployed for the ostensible purposes of efficiency
and fairness have the potential for outright abuse and intentional
discrimination. Algorithms may be coded to search for or market job
finite number of pieces, each with known attributes, and delineated spaces on
the board to which those pieces can move. The real world, on the other hand,
is awash in a constant stream of objects and, for most purposes, is not bound
or constrained in the same manner that a game is. Id. at 171–73.
36
STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A
MODERN APPROACH 671–74, 840 (4th ed. 2022) (Global Edition).
37
Id. at 100.
38
Id. at 166.
39
Id.
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opportunities based on illegal criteria, such as age. 40 Others may be
tempted to deploy an ADM because they know that it will have a
disparate impact, or they set the system up with operating parameters
that they know will result in discrimination. 41 The advantage to the
perpetrator is that they can obfuscate their actions by placing any blame
on the algorithm, while simultaneously claiming that any correlations
the system found are defensible as they are “job-related and consistent
with business necessity” under applicable antidiscrimination law. 42
When mining large amounts of data, ADM systems may also be able
to determine sensitive information about an applicant or employee that
was otherwise unascertainable. Access to this may either bias the
decision-maker or allow them to take a discriminatory action they
otherwise could not have without the system’s input. 43
In addition to these problems, an automated decision-maker
may make the independent determination that discrimination benefits
the employer or achieves whatever target goals that it is programmed
to meet. 44 For example, it could discriminate against disabled workers,
people predisposed to genetic disease, or older workers in order to
lower healthcare costs, or it could discriminate against women of childbearing age in order to reduce aggregate costs associated with leaves
of absence. 45
2.

Disparate Impact Discrimination and the
Replication of Bias

ADM systems may give rise to unintentional bias, sometimes
referred to as “disparate impact discrimination,” for a number of
reasons. Current machine learning systems require a large amount of
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Age Discrimination by Platforms, 40 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5 (2019); Julia Angwin, Noam Scheiber & Ariana Tobin,
Facebook Job Ads Raise Concerns About Age Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/business/facebookjob-ads.html.
41
Kim, supra note 6, at 884.
42
See infra, Section III.A.1.
43
Kim, supra note 6, at 885 (noting Target’s ability to infer shoppers’
pregnancies by mining data from their buying habits).
44
Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 402 (2018).
45
Id. Sullivan cites numerous sources, including the following: Sharona
Hoffman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS L.J.
777, 793 (2017); Berhanu Alemayehu & Kenneth Warner, The Lifetime
Distribution of Health Care Costs, 39 HEALTH SERV. RSCH. 627 (2004);
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and the Squeezed Out
Mom, 105 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1333 (2017); and Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data
and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75 (2016).
40

14

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 39

training data. An ML system used to evaluate candidates or employees
cannot ever know how they will perform in the future, so it relies on
proxies. Unfortunately, “proxies are bound to be inexact and often
unfair.” 46 Training data may be inaccurate, non-representative, or
fundamentally biased due to social phenomenon. 47 If ML systems use
historical data as inputs and models for future decisions, they likely
will be biased by previous human decision-makers’ propensity for
racial and gender-based stereotypes and hiring decisions. 48 Studies
have shown that even names which served as a proxy for the applicants’
race can significantly affect callbacks, with white-sounding names
receiving fifty percent more callbacks than black-sounding ones, 49 and
such subtle human biases may be replicated by ML systems.
The inherent problem here may not be with the algorithms or
ADMs themselves, but “in broader social processes.” 50 Professor
Sandra Mayson summarized the phenomenon as follows:
All prediction functions like a mirror. . . .
Algorithmic prediction produces a precise
reflection of digital data. Subjective
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 108.
Ajunwa, supra note 3, at 637. For example, machine learning systems
trained for facial recognition have been often cited as performing poorly at
recognizing the faces and emotions of people with darker skin. See Barocas &
Selbst, supra note 1, at 680–81 (“[B]iased training data leads to discriminatory
models.”). Barocas and Selbst explore numerous potential problems with
training data, including errors in data labeling, collection of incorrect, partial,
or nonrepresentative data, bias in feature selection, proxies, and masking
(intentional discrimination). Id. at 680–93.
48
Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine
Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016) (examining the impact of race on
recidivism algorithms used for criminal sentencing),
propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing.
49
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 112. See also Latanya Sweeney,
Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 56 COMM. ACM 44, 47 (MAY 2013)
(discussing study findings that Google queries for black-sounding names were
more likely to deliver advertisements for arrest records than searches for
white-sounding names),
https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2013/5/163753-discrimination-inonline-ad-delivery/fulltext.
50
Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 189, 191 (2017). Algorithmic systems may derive correlations
that predict both job-related goals, but which also have a disparate impact.
James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination,
7 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 164 (2016).
46
47
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prediction produces a cloudy reflection of
anecdotal data. But the nature of the analysis
is the same. To predict the future under status
quo conditions is simply to project history
forward. 51
Machine learning systems tasked with mining through vast
quantities of data may also make correlations with applicant or
employee attributes or actions that do not have any clear connection to
job performance. 52 In one instance, a data mining algorithm discovered
a high correlation between computer programmers’ abilities and their
visits to a particular Japanese manga website.53 In other cases, these
correlations have proven more overtly problematic. When it set up an
algorithm to search for information associated with higher employer
turnover, Xerox found several surprising categories. One correlation
was that job applicants who had longer commutes tended to have
higher turnover, but this also had a socioeconomic correlation. Those
applicants with longer commutes were coming from poor
neighborhoods. 54 Allowing an algorithm to make an employment
decision based on this information would have been a classic case of
redlining. 55
Bias may also arise because of fundamental problems in the
configuration or setup of ADM systems. For example, an applicant
intake system may be purposefully or inadvertently coded to require
that applicants input a recent graduation date, thereby excluding older
workers. 56 The initial problem that an employer wishes to have an AI
examine may also be ambiguous and unsuitable to reduction to
computer code. If an ADM is tasked with finding applicants who will
perform well in a given position, how will performance be defined? In
51
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019)
(arguing that a fundamental problem with algorithmic systems lies in the
nature of prediction itself).
52
Kim, supra note 6, at 874.
53
King & Mrkonich, supra note 7, at 560; Don Peck, They’re Watching
You at Work, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Dec. 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watchingyou-at-work/354681/.
54
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 118–19; MARCUS & DAVIS, supra note 27, at
36–37.
55
Kim, supra note 6, at 863.
56
Ajunwa, supra note 3, at 622–23 (noting that when these employees are
deterred from even completing an application, such systems may “discreetly
and disproportionately cull the applications of job seekers who are from
legally protected classes”).
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setting the target variables for the system, the data miner may
unintentionally program it in ways that disadvantage people based on
a protected characteristic under the law. 57 This may stem from the
intentional or unintentional bias of programmers, misinterpretations of
system goals, or from programmers’ preference for binary questions
which can more easily be translated into code.58 Lastly, if an ADM is
set up to provide scores or feedback for human reviews, users may trust
and therefore defer to the algorithm in a process called “automation
bias.” 59
3.

Technical Problems

Even assuming that a model is free of bias, however, other
issues arise. Machine learning models are limited to learning from
successive iterations of data to which they have access. However, when
rejecting an employee, the models currently have no way of knowing
if the decision was a false negative, or improper rejection, because they
receive no feedback about that employee’s future career trajectory or
success. 60 Companies likely will do little to
update their ADM
systems as they strive to efficiently manage large applicant pools, and
the systems may continue to grow outdated and reject more and more
qualified candidates. 61

Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1, at 677–79; Bornstein, supra note 23, at
562–64; Citron, supra note 1, at 1261, 1267–71 (“Although all translations
shade meaning, the translation of policy from human language into code is
more likely to result in a significant alteration of meaning than would the
translation of policy from English into another human language.”).
58
Citron, supra note 1, at 1261–62; Kim, supra note 50, at 192–93
(“Designing a system to be accountable for a substantive goal like
nondiscrimination is difficult because it requires specifying the policy goals
in terms precise enough to be reduced to code. What constitutes forbidden
discrimination is highly contested in the legal and political spheres, and these
debates pose a problem for computer programmers.”).
59
Ajunwa, supra note 3, at 636; Citron, supra note 1, at 1261, 1271 (“The
cognitive system’s engineering literature has found that human beings view
automated systems as error-resistant. Operations of automated systems tend
to trust a computer’s answers. As a result, operators of government decision
systems are less likely to search for information that would contradict a
computer-generated solution. Studies show that human beings rely on
automated decisions even when they suspect system malfunction . . . .
Automation bias effectively turns a computer program’s suggested answer
into a trusted final decision.”).
60
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 111; Kim, supra note 6, at 881–82.
61
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 111.
57
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Machine learning systems and their programs also constantly
struggle with the problem of overfitting. Overfitting occurs when a
machine learning algorithm learns all of the particular examples from
a given set of training data, but does not understand the general pattern
that underlies them, or misunderstands these patterns by focusing on
some other correlated factors in the data. 62 In one study, an image
recognition program was tasked with differentiating pictures of
Siberian Huskies and wolves. 63 Instead of focusing on any inherent
characteristics of the Huskies or wolves, however, the machine
learning system learned to identify wolves because researchers always
presented them in photographs with snowy backgrounds. 64
Another class of technical issues which has significant
implications for discrimination and fairness is referred to as the “black
box problem.” 65 Machine learning and deep learning systems are often
“opaque.” 66 Their data, correlations, and functions make little sense to
humans, and even experts struggle to understand and explain why
particular systems make the decisions that they do. 67 Jerry Kaplan
describes the problem as follows:
In most cases, it’s impossible for the creators
of machine learning programs to peer into
62
NICK POLSON & JAMES SCOTT, AIQ: HOW PEOPLE AND MACHINES ARE
SMARTER TOGETHER 67 (2018) (stating that overfitting “happens when a
model just memorizes the random noise in the training data rather than learns
the underlying pattern. An overfit model may describe the past with perfect
accuracy, yet still be bad at predicting the future”).
63
Marco T. Ribeiro, Samir Singh & Carlos Guestrin, “Why Should I Trust
You?”: Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, KDD ‘16: PROC. 22ND
ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING
1135, 1142–43 (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.04938.pdf.
64
Id.
65
Kim, supra note 6, at 921–22.
66
Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in
Machine Learning Algorithms, 1 BIG DATA & SOC’Y., 1, 1 (2016) (“[R]arely
does one have any concrete sense of how or why a particular classification has
been arrived at from inputs.”)
67
MARCUS & DAVIS, supra note 27, at 66 (“The problem is particularly
acute since neural networks can’t give human-style explanations for their
answers, correct or otherwise. Instead neural networks are ‘black boxes’; they
do what they do, and it is hard to understand what’s inside.”). Without
legislative or regulatory intervention, software developers have little incentive
to develop better frameworks for explainability. FRANK PASQUALE, THE
BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND
INFORMATION 2–10 (2015) (exploring the legal and economic background
leading to the widespread intentional obfuscation of algorithmic systems).
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their intricate, evolving structure to
understand or explain what they know or how
they solve a problem, any more than I can look
into your brain to understand what you are
thinking about. These programs are no better
able to articulate what they do and how they
do it than human experts - they just know the
answer.
They are best understood as
developing their own intuitions and acting on
instinct: a far cry from the old canard that they
“can only do what they are programmed to
do. 68
Given this, it is often difficult for human developers or
researchers to explain why such systems may be right sometimes and
wrong other times. This problem is compounded by the fact that the
systems cannot issue human-style explanations themselves. 69 As a
result, some scholars argue that AI poses unique problems for
antidiscrimination, as it may replicate historical patterns of prejudice
or reflect preexisting biases, but it does so in a manner that is difficult
to detect or explain to juries and courts. 70
68
JERRY KAPLAN, HUMANS NEED NOT APPLY: A GUIDE TO WEALTH AND
WORK IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 30 (2015).
69
MARCUS & DAVIS, supra note 27, at 66. “The problem of explainability
may be exacerbated when the machine learning system’s decision parameters
change over time if audit records are not kept regarding individual decisions.”
Merle Temme, Algorithms and Transparency in View of the New General
Data Protection Regulation, 3 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 473, 479 (2017).
70
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1, at 672, 677 (“By definition, data mining
is always a form of statistical (and therefore seemingly rational)
discrimination. Indeed, the very point of data mining is to provide a rational
basis upon which to distinguish between individuals and to reliably confer to
the individual the qualities possessed by those who seem statistically similar.
Nevertheless, data mining holds the potential to unduly discount members of
legally protected classes and to place them at systematic relative
disadvantage.”). Taken from another point of view, however, this problem is
not unique to AI or machine learning programs. Mitchell Kapor succinctly
stated of the similar problem of humans, “Human intelligence is a marvelous,
subtle, and poorly understood phenomenon. There is no danger of duplicating
it anytime soon.” Kurt Anderson, Enthusiasts and Skeptics Debate Artificial
Intelligence, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 26, 2014),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/tech/2014/11/artificial-intelligencesingularity-theory. Indeed, it is fundamentally difficult to program artificial
intelligence to think like humans partly because there is so much that we do
not understand of our own minds. Many hope for a so-called magic bullet to
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Lastly, machine learning systems can be deliberately
manipulated and fooled by programmers who wish to influence them
and falsify their outputs. For instance, researchers from the University
of Wisconsin were able to use genetic algorithms to “evolve” images
that appear to be no more than static to a human observer, but which
neural networks would confidently classify as recognizable images of
everyday objects. 71 Others have taken recognizable pictures and made
small but specific changes to the image pixels that caused such systems
to make significant errors, such as mistaking Shih Tzu puppies and
school buses for ostriches. 72
4.

Implications for the Data Privacy Rights of
Applicants and Employees.

In addition to issues of bias and technical errors, ADM systems
raise various privacy concerns depending on the underlying data used
during training and deployment. 73 By their very nature, machine
learning systems and deep neural networks process large amounts of
training data during their development, and they continue to use large
sets of data once deployed in order to function. This may be
particularly concerning in the employment context, because employees
have typically been permitted a lower reasonable expectation of
privacy at work than they have in public or at home. 74 ADM systems
unlock artificial intelligence, but Marvin Minsky understood that there would
be no such easy route forward. “What magical trick makes us intelligence?
The trick is that there is no trick. The power of intelligence stems from our
vast diversity, not from any single, perfect principle.” MARVIN MINSKY, THE
SOCIETY OF MIND 308 (1986).
71
Anh Nguyen, Jason Yosinski & Jeff Clune, Deep Neural Networks Are
Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images,
PROC. IEEE CONF. ON COMPUT. VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION, 427, 434
(2015), https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.1897.
72
Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna,
Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow & Rob Fergus, Intriguing Properties of
Neural Networks, PROC. INT’L CONF. ON LEARNING REPRESENTATIONS
(2014), https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199.
73
The right to privacy was first defined as “the right to be let alone.”
Charles S. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193–205 (1890). Conceptions of the right to privacy steadily grew to
incorporate four distinct areas: (1) informational privacy, (2) bodily privacy,
(3) territorial privacy, and (4) communications privacy. PETER SWIRE &
DEBRAE KENNEDY-MAYO, U.S. PRIVATE-SECTOR PRIVACY 13–14 (3d ed.
2020).
74
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring
Applications and Wearable Technology as the New Data-Centric Research
Agenda for Employment and Labor Law, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 21, 31 (2018);
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tasked with monitoring employees’ actions on their computers may
theoretically engage in a wide variety of tracking, including counting
employees’ keystrokes, using video to monitor their movements,
scanning for employees’ use of personal email, 75 or even monitoring
periods of inactivity which may reveal how often employees use the
restroom, check their insulin, or engage in protected activity such as
discussions of work activities or union organizing. 76
The proliferation of ADM systems for workplace usage has
also followed the expansion of data collected from three broad sources:
digital information, sensors, and employee self-tracking through
devices such as fitness trackers or smart phone apps. 77 The
proliferation of wearable devices reveals location data that may be
particularly sensitive, 78 but which has high utility for employers who
wish to monitor employee productivity, interactions, break patterns,
and safety. 79 For example, Amazon has patented technology that can
be used to track employees’ locations within their distribution center.
In conjunction with the company’s inventory tracking system, this
technology could also direct those employees in real-time to the
location of an item through haptic feedback, without the need for an
employee to scan a computer screen. 80 Other systems have been
designed to monitor employees’ physical locations in relation to
hazardous areas, and to alert their supervisors when the employees may
stray out of a geofenced area within their worksite.81 These systems
help employees by physically protecting them, while also
strengthening employers’ overall safety plans and reducing workers’
compensation claims. 82 Yet, any system for monitoring an employee’s
precise physical location also carries with it the potential for abuse. An
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (“Public employees’
expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of
actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation . . . An
office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other
employees, and business and personal invitees.”).
75
Corbyn, supra note 9.
76
Protected activities under the NLRA can be found at National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
77
Adams-Prassl, supra note 4, at 134–35.
78
The California Privacy Rights Act, for example, defines precise
geolocation data as particularly sensitive personal information. CPRA §
1798.140(ae)(1)(C).
79
Ajunwa, supra note 74, at 25–27, 46-47.
80
Id. at 34–35.
81
Id. at 39.
82
Id. at 46–48.
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employer may use a physical device on an employee’s or an employerowned automobile to track their driving for safety purposes or
productivity during the work day, but such a device may also be used
during non-working hours to track an employee’s trips to the doctor, to
their homes, or to other locations that reveal personal or protected
information. They can also, in the hands of the wrong manager, be
used for stalking and harassment. 83
C.

Current Uses for ADMs and Artificial Intelligence in
Employment

Perhaps the first and largest current impact of ADM systems
in employment is also the first step at which most individuals come into
contact with a potential employer: at the time of submission of a
resume. ADM systems often are built into applicant tracking systems
(ATS) and have come to act as gatekeepers for employers both large
and small. The justification for these systems is typically their
efficiency. 84 As job posting information has spread online, the ease at
which applicants can find openings has multiplied. Job mobility has
also increased, and as a result, the number of applicants for an average
job opening has skyrocketed. While the pool of available talent has
increased, reviewing and scoring resumes consumes a significant
amount of recruiters’ time, costing employers money and slowing
down the hiring process. Employers have turned to ADM systems to
manage the increased flow of new applicants.85 ATS allow recruiters
to match keywords and filter applicants’ resumes, 86 but more advanced

Id. at 25–26.
Bornstein, supra note 23, at 530–31. Automated systems can also mine
information online from public sources about candidates. For example,
systems can look at whether computer programmers have contributed to opensource projects and recommend them for jobs accordingly. Peck, supra note
53; Matt Richtel, How Big Data Is Playing Recruiter for Specialized Workers,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/technology/how-big-data-isplaying-recruiter-for-specialized-workers.html.
85
Studies have shown that nearly all of the Fortune 500 companies use
applicant tracking systems in order to manage applications and resumes.
Linda Qu, 99% of Fortune 500 Companies use Applicant Tracking Systems,
JOBSCAN (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.jobscan.co/blog/99-percent-fortune500-ats/.
86
Gray Beltran, The Pandemic Changed Everything About Work, Except
the Humble Résumé, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/22/business/pandemic-workresumes.html.
83
84
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features of some ATS compare resumes to job descriptions and provide
automated rankings. 87
As you might expect, human resources
departments rely on automatic systems to
winnow down piles of résumés. In fact, some
72 percent of résumés are never seen by
human eyes. Computer programs flip through
them, pulling out the skills and experiences
that the employer is looking for. Then they
score each résumé as a match for the job
opening. It’s up to the people in the human
resources department to decide where the
cutoff is, but the more candidates they can
eliminate with this first screening, the fewer
human-hours they’ll have to spend processing
the top matches. 88
For example, at Unilever, the Human Resources Department
set a goal of increasing diversity by focusing on entry-level talent and
hiring. Existing processes were not able to evaluate recruits in
sufficient numbers and give applicants individual attention. So,
Unilever adapted its processes to include two rounds of tests and
interviews that deployed AI. In the first round, candidates were asked
to play online games that assessed traits such as risk aversion. These
helped to determine which individuals may be well-suited for particular
positions. In round two, applicants were asked to submit videos with
answers to questions related to their specific job opening. Responses
were analyzed by AI, including applicants’ body language and tone.
Finally, in the third round, in-person interviews were conducted at
Unilever. The process change resulted in doubling applicants to 30,000
in a year, increasing applications from universities from 840 to 2,600
in that year, and increasing the socioeconomic diversity of new hires.
The process also proved efficient for Unilever’s recruiting department.
The average time from application to hiring decision dropped from 4
months to 4 weeks, and the time recruiters spent reviewing applications
dropped by seventy-five percent. 89
Qu, supra note 85.
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 113–14.
89
H. James Wilson & Paul R. Daugherty, Collaborative Intelligence:
Humans and AI Are Joining Forces, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/07/collaborative-intelligence-humans-and-ai-arejoining-forces.
87
88
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Employers can also be motivated by the belief that automated
systems are less biased than human reviewers. 90 Many software
providers tout their potential benefits for diversity and inclusion.
HireVue, for instance, advertises that “Structured interviews ensure
consistency” and “AI-Driven insights [are] proven to reduce bias.” 91
HireEZ goes a step further and advertises the ability of its software to
proactively find diverse candidates:
Identify More Underrepresented Talent.
Search for talent with hireEZ’s Diversity
Sourcing to focus on minority groups for your
open roles . . . hireEZ analyzes profiles for
pronouns, schools, memberships with
diversity organizations, and more to support
you in building more inclusive talent
pipelines. 92
Aside from the claims to benefit employers, there may be
benefits to such systems for applicants. Technology that automates
search processes may be able to discover qualified individuals and
match them with jobs from outside of their geographic region, or
outside of the typical types of jobs that they may have searched.93
Another increasingly popular use for artificial intelligence in
recruiting is video interview software. Such software can take two
forms. It can provide a channel for a live interview between two
people, or it can be used for an asynchronous interview in which an
applicant’s interview is conducted and recorded, often using structured
interview questions. Many of these video interview software systems
have begun to incorporate machine learning components used to
automatically score applicants. “These capabilities are rapidly
developing in ways that help interviewers to analyze facial expressions,
nonverbal behavior, and voice intonation for signs of how well a job

Ifeoma Ajunwa, Beware of Automated Hiring, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/opinion/ai-hiringdiscrimination.html; Kim, supra note 6, at 869–71.
91
Increase diversity and mitigate bias, HIREVUE,
https://www.hirevue.com/employment-diversity-bias (last visited Aug. 10,
2022).
92
Your Diversity Recruiting Just Got Easier, HIREEZ,
https://hireez.com/solutions/diversity-inclusion/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2022).
93
Adams-Prassl, supra note 4, at 129.
90
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seeker will fit in with a company’s needs and culture.” 94
Artificial intelligence may be incorporated into scheduling
software to regularly arrange work schedules or to slot part-time
workers into new or open shifts depending on changes in business
demand or employee absences. Current scheduling software can be
programmed with a variety of rules, including legal compliance, and
arrange workers in overlapping shifts so that they all have adequate
time to take allotted meal breaks and avoid overtime. 95 There are
potentially significant benefits in this area, as ADM systems can
theoretically be used to discover patterns related to employee
management and staffing that may in some cases save money, and in
other cases save lives. 96 For example, future scheduling software
systems may use information such as average patient data, upcoming
scheduling procedures, previous work schedules, absences, and late
arrivals for employees, and it may notice that a particular nurse is
consistently fifteen minutes late on the third Thursday of every month.
Due to a critical surgery scheduled for the upcoming Thursday, an
ADM system could refrain from scheduling that nurse for the shift in
question. 97 In doing so, the ADM system may benefit the hospital,
Video Interviewing, ICIMS, https://www.icims.com/glossary/videointerviewing/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2022).
95
See, e.g., Employee Scheduling Software for Businesses, ADP,
https://www.adp.com/resources/articles-andinsights/articles/e/employee-scheduling.aspx (last visited Aug. 10, 2022);
Restaurant Scheduling Software, 7SHIFTS,
https://www.7shifts.com/restaurant-employee-scheduling-software (last
visited Aug. 10, 2022).
96
Some criticize algorithmic scheduling for the potential negative effect
on employees’ work-life balance. See, e.g., O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 123–40;
Jodi Kantor, Working Anything But 9 to 5, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/starbucks-workersscheduling-hours.html.
97
The decision could be construed as an adverse employment action,
especially if carried out more than a single time, and it raises novel issues with
respect to data privacy, fairness, and potential discrimination. Perhaps, for
example, the nurse has a standing doctor’s appointment of their own, and the
scheduling deviation has been discussed with their manager, who granted an
accommodation. Currently, however, there are no laws in the United States
that would require the employer to give the nurse notice of the use of
algorithms to determine their schedule, and there have been no significant
cases interpreting the use of AI under Title VII or applicable
antidiscrimination laws. This article argues that the best approach will likely
be to provide transparency to the nurse in question, informing him or her of
the ADM system’s involvement. If the nurse believes the decision was made
unfairly, he or she can raise an internal complaint, and if that fails, they can
94
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doctor, patient, and even the nurse, who is provided a more appropriate
work schedule.
On the other hand, scheduling software may be used in ways
detrimental to employees, such as to ensure that they do not reach an
adequate number of hours to gain benefits. Scheduling algorithms also
may not be programmed to prioritize predictability, and this gives rise
to a number of problems. Unpredictable schedules may cause issues
with employees’ ability to engage in consistent attendance at school or
college, care for children or family members, or make necessary health
appointments. Low-wage workers who need to work multiple jobs
may find juggling inconsistent schedules to be impossible and may not
be able to secure the work they need. Finally, inconsistent schedules
created by software may take a toll on the families of workers,
imposing chaotic lives on children just as they do so on parents, and
severely harming childhood development. 98
Artificial intelligence and ADMs may augment and eventually
replace many managerial duties. 99 An infamous example of a company
that widely deploys productivity tracking and algorithms to manage its
workforce is Amazon. 100 Because of this, California became the first
state to place limitations on Amazon’s practices of using employee
quotas at its warehouses in 2021. AB 701 requires that:
Each employer shall provide to each
employee, upon hire, or within 30 days of the
effective date of this part, a written description
of each quota to which the employee is
subject, including the quantified number of
tasks to be performed or materials to be
produced or handled, within the defined time
period, and any potential adverse employment
pursue their rights under applicable antidiscrimination law. The review of the
ADM’s decision can be placed in the hands of humans for a more thorough
review, but the initial decision not to schedule the nurse likely is one that is
suitable and appropriate for the ADM system.
98
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 128–30.
99
Adams-Prassl, supra note 4, at 124 (“Instead of taking away workers’
jobs, I suggest, advances in AI-driven decision-making will first and foremost
change their managers’ daily routines, augmenting and eventually replacing
human day-to-day control over the workplace: we are witnessing the rise of
the “algorithmic boss.”).
100
Anabelle Williams, 5 ways Amazon monitors its employees, from AI
cameras to hiring a spy agency, INSIDER (Apr. 5, 2021),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-amazon-monitors-employees-aicameras-union-surveillance-spy-agency-2021-4.
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action that could result from failure to meet
the quota. 101
The law further states that employees should not be required to
meet quotas that would prevent their ability to take meal breaks, rest
breaks, or to use the bathroom. 102 Although modest in both scope and
its probable effect (California already requires employees be
“provided” meal and rest breaks 103), AB 701 is indicative of the
growing concerns of members of the public and legislators that
algorithms are being deployed at an increasing rate to manage
employees, often in manners that are opaque and hidden from the
employees themselves. 104
In one of the first cases to weigh the propriety of machine
learning algorithms, the Houston Independent School District was sued
by a group of teachers as the result of using an algorithm that
incorporated test data from teachers’ classes. 105 In Hous. Fed’n of
Teachers, public school teachers and the teachers’ union sued under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses
seeking to enjoin the use of an algorithmic scoring system that rated
their performance based on student test scores. 106 The school district
utilized a third-party software to calculate student progress on test
scores using a value-added model called the Educational Value-Added
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2101 (West 2022).
Id. at § 2102.
103
See Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1040
(2012) (holding an employer fulfills its duty to provide a meal period where it
“relieves its employees of all duty, relinquishes control over their activities,
permits them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30-minute
break,” and “does not impede or discourage them from doing so”).
104
Algorithmic management is not limited to employees., however.
Platform services participating in the gig economy, such as Uber, deploy
systems to gather information about their independent contractors’
performance, including customer ratings and productivity. Adams-Prassl,
supra note 4, at 131; Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and
Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J.
COMMC’N 3758, 3761–66 (2016). A United States District Court examining
Uber’s practices determined that the level of monitoring arguably gave Uber
a “tremendous amount of control over the ‘manner and means’ of its drivers’
performance” for purposes of determining whether or not they were properly
classified as independent contractors. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 3d 1133, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
105
Hous. Fed’n of Tchrs., Loc. 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
106
Id. at 1171.
101
102
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Assessment System (EVAAS). 107
EVAAS measured teacher
effectiveness by tracking teachers’ impact on student test scores over
time, based on comparing average test scores of the teachers’ students
versus statewide test scores for students in the same grade and
course. 108 Teachers were then assigned a rating (well above, above, no
detectable difference, below, or well below), and shortly after adoption
of the software, the school district began a policy of terminating
teachers based on their algorithmically-generated EVAAS score. 109
While granting the school district its motion for summary
judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for substantive due process and equal
protection, the district court allowed a procedural due process violation
claim to proceed. 110 Pointing to Supreme Court precedent, the court
wrote, “The core requirement of procedural due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” 111 However, the teachers had no such opportunity. The
software provider claimed trade secret protection over the algorithms
and the software used to calculate scores and denied the school district
access to such programs. 112 The school district consequently could not
provide teachers access (and did not have access itself) to the computer
algorithms and data necessary to verify the accuracy of the scores, and
it took no steps to verify or audit the scores. 113 The court noted that
scores could be “erroneously calculated for any number of reasons,
ranging from data-entry mistakes to glitches in the computer code
itself.” 114 This system ran counter to due process requirements, as
described by the Supreme Court:

Id. at 1172.
Id.
109
Id. at 1172–74.
110
Id. at 1180. With respect to plaintiffs’ claims for violation of
substantive due process and the equal protection clause, the court deployed
rational basis scrutiny. Plaintiffs alleged that EVAAS failed rational basis
scrutiny “because it is sytematically [sic] biased against large categories of
teachers on the basis of the type and size of classrooms they teach, is highly
volatile, is highly variable on the basis of which models or tests are used, and
is highly divergent from other measures of teacher effectiveness.” Id. The
court disagreed, holding that the “constitutional status of rationality allows
governments to use blunt tools which may produce only marginal results.” Id.
at 1182.
111
Hous. Fed’n of Tchrs., Loc. 2415., 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1175 (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
112
Id. at 1177.
113
Id. at 1176–77.
114
Id. at 1177.
107
108
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The purpose of [the due process] requirement
is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the
individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to
protect his use and possession of property
from arbitrary encroachment—to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations
of property . . . . For when a person has an
opportunity to speak up in his own defense,
and when the State must listen to what he has
to say, substantively unfair and simply
mistaken deprivations of property interests
can be prevented. 115
The court ruled that such protections were impossible for the
teachers because of the plain lack of transparency. Without access to
the information involved in the decision-making process, “EVAAS
scores will remain a mysterious ‘black box,’ impervious to
challenge.” 116
III.

LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ADMS AND ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN EMPLOYMENT
A.

Current Regulations in the United States
1.

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
Regulations

As discussed previously, one of the most significant concerns
for ADMs in the workplace is the potential for bias and discrimination.
The United States, however, already has strong antidiscrimination laws
that provide redress when hiring or termination decisions are made
based on an applicant or employees protected characteristics. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against people
because of their protected class in the terms and conditions of
employment, which includes hiring. 117 The law “proscribes not only
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972).
Hous. Fed’n of Tchrs., Loc. 2415, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
117
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer – to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”). Title VII has also been interpreted to prohibit discrimination based
on sexual orientation or transgender status. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia,
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1742–43 (2020).
115
116
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overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation.” 118 Other federal laws guard against
discrimination based on age, pregnancy, disability, protected military
status, and genetic information. 119 The use of policies or practices that
may not overtly target a protected class, but nonetheless have an impact
on hiring based on a protected characteristic, is known as “disparate
impact discrimination.” Discrimination can therefore be caused by
facially neutral policies and does not require a showing of bad intent. 120
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate
as “built-in headwinds” for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job
capability. 121
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The substance
of disparate impact discrimination standards and procedures depend on
whether we approach discrimination with the goal of anticlassification (formal
equality) or antisubordination (substantive equality). Bornstein, supra note 23,
at 525. Although this may ultimately impact how such algorithms are
evaluated under existing laws, it is not within the scope of this article.
119
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§
621–634; Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076 (amending Title VII to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213;
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38
U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335; Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881.
120
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52–53 (2003) (“[D]isparateimpact claims ‘involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.’ . . . ‘[A] facially
neutral employment practice may be deemed illegally discriminatory without
evidence of the employer's subjective intent to discriminate that is required in
a ‘disparate-treatment’ case.”).
121
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Disparate impact rules can even adversely
impact employers who attempt to proactively implement policies to improve
workforce diversity. The Supreme Court has held that employers who
disregard the result of a valid job selection process, such as performance-based
job tests for hiring, because the tests did not yield a racially diverse group of
candidates may be found to have intentionally discriminated against the
initially successful candidates based on their race, “absent a strong basis in
evidence that the test was deficient and that discarding the results is necessary
to avoid violating the disparate-impact provision.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557
U.S. 557, 583–84 (2009).
118
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The burden of proof for a disparate impact claim is initially on
a plaintiff to show that a particular employment practice caused the
exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their
protected characteristic. 122 Plaintiffs typically demonstrate this
through mathematical modeling of the impact of the practice or policy
on applicants or employees using either the “four-fifths rule” or a
statistical significance test.123 “Briefly stated, under the four-fifths
rule, a disparity is actionable when one group’s pass rate is less than
four-fifths (eighty percent) of another group’s pass rate.” 124 Statistical
significance tests, on the other hand, attempt to distinguish whether
deviations in the data are due to random chance or caused by a specific
policy through a number of different mathematical models.
“Researchers most commonly use the ninety-five percent confidence
level, which is also termed the five percent (0.05) level of significance
. . . . At the ninety-five percent level, we can be ninety-five percent
certain that the observed disparity in the applicant pool reflects a real
disparity in the relevant labor market with respect to the challenged
practice. There is still, however, a one in twenty possibility that there
is no disparity in the overall population.” 125
Following the plaintiff’s initial showing, the defendant in a
disparate impact case can then attempt to rebut the plaintiff’s statistics,
or it can show that the requirement has a relationship to employment.
In other words, they must show the policy or practice is “job related”
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
“To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, plaintiffs must
show that a particular employment practice caused an adverse impact on the
basis of a protected status, such as race. Plaintiffs generally prove such
causation by comparing the selection rates of majority and minority applicants
for a position and then showing that the disparity is statistically significant or
that it violates the four-fifths rule. The Supreme Court has rejected a ‘rigid
mathematical formula’ for disparate impact, providing instead the ambiguous
guidance to lower courts that ‘statistical disparities must be sufficiently
substantial that they raise . . . an inference of causation.’” Jennifer L. Peresie,
Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J.
773, 777–78 (2009).
124
Id. at 774.
125
Id. at 785–86. Each of these tests has significant shortcomings.
Statistical significance tests are highly sensitive to sample size and tend to
insulate smaller employers from legal claims. Id. at 787. The four-fifths rule
tends to disproportionately burden smaller employers, as well as imply that
there is an acceptable level (twenty percent) of discrimination which the law
will condone. McKenzie Raub, Bots, Bias and Big Data: Artificial
Intelligence, Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring
Practices, 71 ARK. L. REV. 529, 546–47 (2018).
122
123
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and “consistent with business necessity.” 126 The burden then shifts
back to plaintiff to show that an alternative employment practice would
have served the employer’s legitimate interests without a similar
discriminatory effect, and that the employer “refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice.” 127
Because of the nature of machine learning systems, as
previously discussed, they often give rise to black box problems
because they make data correlations, associating various inputs in ways
that are not intelligible to programmers, developers, or auditors, and
then they issue determinations and outputs based on these opaque
processes. 128 This problem has been cited as particularly acute in the
employment context because of the burden shifting analysis performed
in disparate impact cases. 129 Where the correlations and reasoning for
the automated system’s decision are opaque, a defendant company may
plausibly argue any data correlation to job performance establishes the
“job-related” defense. 130 It may then be exceedingly difficult for the
plaintiff to demonstrate that an alternative and less burdensome option
existed. 131 To date, however, no court in the United States has
published any significant opinion addressing these problems under the
disparate impact theory.

126
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 406 (1975); Watson,
487 U.S. at 998; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
127
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
128
See infra, Section II.A.3.
129
Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 50, at 177 (“Incomprehensible
discrimination will not stand. Applicants who are judged and found wanting
deserve a better explanation than, ‘The computer said so.’ Sometimes
computers say so for the wrong reasons‒and it is employers’ duty to ensure
that they do not.”).
130
Kim, supra note 6, at 920 (“If a statistical correlation were sufficient
to satisfy the defense of job-relatedness, the standard would be a tautology
rather than a meaningful legal test.”).
131
Many scholars have noted the potential problem with the burden
shifting and the “job-related” defense, while others have proposed new
interpretations of Title VII that would support disparate impact claims against
AI systems. A full examination of this lies beyond the scope of this article.
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1, at 701–712; Kim, supra note 6 (arguing Title
VII incorporates an anti-classification theory applicable to AI systems);
Sullivan, supra note 44, at 398; Bornstein, supra note 23, at 527 (proposing
an anti-stereotyping approach to algorithmic discrimination); Joshua A. Kroll,
Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David
G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633,
637 (2017) (proposing technical solutions to the issues of discriminatory
algorithms).
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The dearth of court authority on the issue of AI and disparate
impact, despite the ubiquity of such systems in recruitment and hiring,
likely stems directly from their relative invisibility. Most employees
and applicants simply lack the knowledge that they were ever subject
to a flawed policy or practice to begin with. No federal laws in the
United States require disclosure to applicants or employees when an
ADM system is used as part of their hiring or termination. Two laws
have recently been passed that would offer a degree of transparency in
Illinois and New York City, but those are of limited application. 132
Furthermore, the data privacy laws being passed and contemplated by
various state legislatures typically carve out employees from their
coverage. 133 This is a marked difference with the European Union,
which has extended transparency both with respect to employee data
privacy under the GDPR, and which has proposed coverage of AI
systems affecting employees under the E.U. AI Proposal introduced in
April 2022. 134
The issue of transparency is not unique to ADM systems with
respect to employment decisions, and in particular hiring. Employees
often are not told—and do not ask—about the reasons for an employer
denying their job application. Even if an applicant does ask why they
did not get the job, employers generally have no obligation to provide
them such information. Without the barest of information, employees
are unlikely to file suit. This leads to opaque hiring practices, and
employers who may use this to their advantage. Take, for example, the
use of personality tests as a prerequisite for hiring. These tests may
superficially grade applicants for personality types such as
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and
openness to ideas, but they also may have a disparate impact on
individuals with histories of mental illness and create a significant
burden for them to obtain even entry level jobs for which they are
otherwise qualified. 135 These individuals, however, rarely learn that
the personality test formed the basis for their rejection, and they are
unlikely to seek or retain an attorney to challenge those decisions. 136
See infra, Section III.A.3.
See infra, Section III.A.2.ii.
134
GDPR art. 88; Proposal for a Regulation Of The European Parliament
And Of The Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules On Artificial
Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union
Legislative Acts, COM (2015) 452 final (Apr. 1, 2021) [hereinafter “E.U. AI
Proposal”].
135
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 105–22.
136
Id. at 105–06. Compare id. with Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (holding that
intelligence tests are illegal unless an employer can demonstrate they are a
reasonable measure of job performance).
132
133
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Thus, we have strong antidiscrimination laws in the United States, but
often applicants and employees have no understanding that they may
have been wronged, and have no reason to pursue remedies under the
existing laws. The ADM systems are operating as “dark systems,” and
there is the significant possibility these systems are perpetuating
historical discrimination or simply operating pursuant to biased and
unfair parameters.
2.

Data Privacy Regulations in the United
States
i.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”)

One significant deviation from the general rule that employees
are not entitled to transparency regarding the reasons for an adverse
employment decision comes from the area of background checks. In
1970, Congress passed the first legislation in the United States
governing the privacy of consumer information, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”). 137 In so doing, Congress found that “[a]n
elaborate mechanism has been developed for investigating and
evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, and general reputation of consumers,” and “[t]here is need
to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the
consumer’s right to privacy.” 138 Congress therefore enacted the FCRA
with the goal of establishing “reasonable procedures” that are “fair and
equitable to the consumer, with regard to confidentiality, accuracy,
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.” 139
As a key component of this legislation, the government
required that when employers perform background checks on
employees or applicants, they must engage in an “adverse action
process” whenever they uncover negative information that they intend
to use as the basis for employment terminations or when declining an
applicant for employment. 140 That adverse action process consists of
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681); PRISCILLA M. REGAN,
LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY
101 (1995) (noting the FCRA was the first information or data privacy
legislation in the United States).
138
15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)(4).
139
Id. at § 1681(b).
140
Id. at §§ 1681b(b)(3)(A), 1681m(a). The FCRA uses the term
“consumer report,” but this article will refer to such reports by the more
commonplace term, “background check.”
137
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two steps. First, the employer must provide a pre-adverse action notice
to the employee or applicant containing a copy of the background
check and a description of that person’s rights under the FCRA. 141 The
employee or applicant then has the opportunity to provide evidence that
the background check may contain errors. Although the FCRA does
not specify how much time an employer should provide to an
employee, the Federal Trade Commission has said, “[s]ome reasonable
period of time must elapse, but the minimum length will vary
depending on the particular circumstances involved.” 142 After this
reasonable time period has passed, the employer may take action based
on the information contained in the background check, but it is required
to provide a final adverse action notice containing information
regarding the employee’s credit score (if applicable), information
regarding the credit reporting agency (“CRA”) which provided the
background check, a statement that the CRA did not make the adverse
action decision, information regarding how an employee may request
a copy of the report, and details regarding how the employee or
applicant can contact the CRA to dispute the accuracy or completeness
of the report. 143
ii.

State General Data Protection Laws

As discussed previously, several states have passed general
data protection legislation, including California, Colorado, and
Virginia, and each of these states grapples with issues related to
automated decision-making. However, none of these laws adequately
address the problem of automated decision-making with respect to its
use in the employment context.
The first general data protection legislation passed in
California, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”)
did not call for any specific requirements regarding automated

141
Id. at § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B), in
using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse
action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such
adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates - (i) a
copy of the report; and (ii) a description in writing of the rights of the
consumer under this subchapter, as described by the Bureau under Section
1681g(c)(3) of this title.”)
142
FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING ACT: AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF
INTERPRETATIONS 52 (2011).
143
15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a).
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decision-making. 144 That changed, however, in 2020, when California
voters opted in favor of the California Privacy Rights Act (“CPRA”). 145
The CPRA updated and significantly expanded many aspects of the
CCPA, and it added several provisions related to automated decisionmaking, including a requirement that the newly-formed California
Privacy Protection Agency (“CPPA”) release regulations on the
issue. 146 The CPRA defines “profiling” as broadly including the
“automated processing of personal information” which would include
an individual’s performance at work:
(z) ‘Profiling’ means any form of automated
processing of personal information, . . . in
particular to analyze or predict aspects
concerning
that
natural
person’s
performance at work, economic situation,
health, personal preferences, interests,
reliability,
behavior,
location,
or
147
movements.
Under Section 1798.185, the CPRA requires agency
rulemaking on the issue of automated decision-making, and in
particular, requires the regulations to address the extent to which
businesses may engage in automated decision-making, and how they
may respond to requests for information about the software’s internal
logic. Specifically, the CPPA is tasked to issue:
regulations governing access and opt-out
rights with respect to businesses’ use of
automated
decisionmaking
technology,
including profiling and requiring businesses’
response to access requests to include
meaningful information about the logic
involved in those decisionmaking processes,
144

California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100199.100 (West 2022).
145
California Privacy Rights Act, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807 (to be codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199.100 (effective Jan. 1, 2023)) [hereinafter
“CPRA”]; Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin, By passing Proposition 24,
California voters up the ante on federal privacy law, BROOKINGS (Nov. 17,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/11/17/by-passingproposition-24-california-voters-up-the-ante-on-federal-privacy-law/.
146
Id. at §§ 1798.140, 1798.185(a)(16).
147
Id. at § 1798.140 (emphasis added).

36

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 39

as well as a description of the likely outcome
of the process with respect to the consumer. 148
The CPRA becomes effective on January 1, 2023, but at the time of
this writing, the California Private Protection Agency has not yet
released proposed regulations related to automated decision-making.
While the full scope of California’s protections has yet to be
developed, Colorado and Virginia’s data protection laws ultimately
provide little more than an ability for consumers to opt out of
automated decision-making with respect to recruiting emails. Unlike
the law in California, the data protection laws passed in Virginia and
Colorado specifically exclude employees from their general
provisions. 149 However, both laws do provide consumers the ability to
opt out of the automated processing of their data. For example, the
Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (“VCDPA”) permits a
consumer to opt out of data processing for the purposes of “(i) targeted
advertising, (ii) the sale of personal data, or (iii) profiling in furtherance
of decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects
concerning the consumer.” 150
Even though the VCDPA and the Colorado Privacy Act
(“CPA”) broadly carve out coverage of employees, they make a
distinction for automated decision-making for recruiting purposes. In
defining the phrase “profiling in further of decisions that produce legal
or similarly significant effects concerning the consumer,” the VCDPA
specifically references decisions that may affect “employment
opportunities”:
Id. at § 1798.185(a)(16) (emphasis added).
Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, S. 1392, 2021 Va. Acts (2021)
(to be codified at VA. CODE. ANN. § 59.1-571 (West 2023) (effective Jan. 1,
2023)) (“‘Consumer’ means a natural person who is a resident of the
Commonwealth acting only in an individual or household context. It does not
include a natural person acting in a commercial or employment context.”)
[hereinafter “VCDPA”]; Colorado Privacy Act, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445
(to be codified at COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-1303(6) (West 2023) (effective
Jan. 1, 2023)) (“Consumer” means “an individual who is a Colorado resident
acting only in an individual or household context; and (b) does not include an
individual acting in a commercial or employment context, as a job applicant,
or as a beneficiary of someone acting in an employment context.”) [hereinafter
“CPA”].
150
VCDPA § 59.1-573. The VCDPA further defines “profiling” in a
manner that would capture automated decision-making: “any form of
automated processing performed on personal data to evaluate, analyze, or
predict personal aspects related to an identified or identifiable natural person’s
economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability,
behavior, location, or movements.” Id. at § 59.1-571.
148
149

2022]

DARK SYSTEMS REPROGRAMMING AI

37

‘Decisions that produce legal or similarly
significant effects concerning a consumer’
means a decision made by the controller that
results in the provision or denial by the
controller of . . . employment opportunities. 151
In language that is nearly verbatim to that passed by Virginia,
the Colorado Privacy Act also provides consumers the ability to opt out
of “profiling,” including “decisions that produce legal or similarly
significant effects concerning a consumer,” and defines such decisions
to include those that affect employment opportunities. 152 As they
contain general exemptions for employees and applicants, the CPA and
VCDPA appear to provide little more than the ability of consumers to
opt out of unsolicited emails which recruiters have sent as the result of
using automated recruiting software, and therefore they do little to
mitigate potential negative consequences and unfairness associated
generally with ADM systems for employment purposes.
Protections under current data privacy laws for automated
decision-making in the employment context are therefore quite limited
in the United States. Although regulations in California have yet to be
released, if they follow in the same general direction as those in
Virginia and Colorado, they may provide little more than the right to
opt out of automated decision-making for non-applicants. In other
words, once an individual actively engages in the application process,
their rights to opt out may disappear. Even if the right to opt out were
extended to employees and applicants, these laws would provide no
requirement for employers to provide notice that they have been subject
to an adverse decision as the result of automated decision-making
software. Employees therefore will likely not have knowledge of even
the basic involvement of ADM software, and they will be unlikely to
challenge the decisions on that basis, if at all.
3.

Direct Regulations of AI Products in the
United States
i.

Illinois Artificial Intelligence Video
Interview Act

In 2020, Illinois became the first state to pass a standalone law
directly addressing the use of artificial intelligence systems for

151
152

Id. at § 59.1-571.
CPA §§ 6-1-1303(10)(20), 6-1-1306.
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employment purposes. 153 The Illinois law contains a consent
requirement and an additional feature related to accountability.
First, the Illinois Act requires a specific set of disclosures and
consent from the applicant prior to an employer deploying an AI
system during an applicant interview. The Act requires that the
employer: (a) “[n]otify each applicant before the interview that
artificial intelligence may be used to analyze the applicant’s video
interview”; (b) “[p]rovide each applicant with information before the
interview explaining how the artificial intelligence works and what
general types of characteristics it uses to evaluate applicants”; 154 and
(c) obtain consent before the interview for use of the AI program. 155
Second, Illinois requires a significant degree of accountability
through ongoing evaluation and reporting related to the use of such
programs. It requires that companies that “rely solely” upon an AI
analysis of a video interview to then gather data on the race and
ethnicity of both those applicants who are offered an in-person
interview and those applicants who are subsequently hired. The
companies must subsequently report that data to the Illinois
Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity on a yearly
basis. 156
ii.

New York City Artificial Intelligence
Ordinance

Following the Illinois Artificial Intelligence Video Interview
Act, New York City passed its own municipal ordinance regarding
artificial intelligence in 2021. Like the Illinois act, New York City
specifically targets the use of ADM systems in the recruiting process,
but the New York Ordinance goes further.
First, the New York City AI Ordinance requires independent
bias audits. These audits, whose requirements are not described in
detail by the statute, must be conducted once a year prior to the use of

Illinois Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act, 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 42/1 to 42/20 (2022) [hereinafter “Illinois AI Video Interview Act”].
154
Professor Ifeoma Ajunwa criticizes the lack of specificity with respect
to what information must be provided to applicants. Ajunwa, supra note 3, at
645. She does not, however, offer any specific alternative language. Given
the nascent nature of the technology and the frequent preference of legislatures
for technology neutral language, legal flexibility may be a strength of the law
allowing courts or regulatory agencies to provide further guidance.
155
Illinois AI Video Interview Act, 820 ILCS 42/5.
156
Id. at 42/20.
153
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such a tool, and the most recent bias audit must be published on the
employer’s website. 157
Second, the Ordinance provides a general notice and right to
opt-out. In particular, the employer must provide any employee or
candidate screened: (a) notice no less than 10 business days before the
use of the ADM system, and (b) the ability to request an alternative
selection procedure. 158
Lastly, the Ordinance requires disclosure of certain basic
system information. An employer in the city utilizing an ADM system
must provide information about the type of data collected and the
source of data to the employee or candidate either (a) on the company
website, or (b) within 30 days of a written request. 159
B.

Global Frameworks
1.

E.U. General Data Protection Regulation

Although the United States has limited legislation regarding
data privacy and AI systems, the same is not true in Europe. In 2016,
the European Union passed the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”) in an attempt to both harmonize the data privacy practices
of Member Nations for furtherance of trade and to protect the
fundamental rights of privacy and nondiscrimination of member
citizens. 160 Following its passage and implementation, the GDPR soon
became the gold standard for data privacy, emulated by numerous
foreign countries and used as a template for state legislatures in the
United States hoping to pass their own data privacy laws. 161
The GDPR bestows numerous rights and responsibilities on
data subjects and data controllers, but it also includes a specific right
of access that allows data subjects to request from a data controller
what information is being processed about them. This right contains a
specific requirement with respect to ADM systems:
The data subject shall have the right to obtain
from the controller confirmation as to whether
or not personal data concerning him or her are
being processed, and where that is the case,
access to the personal data and the following
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 20-871(a)(1)(2) (2022).
See id.
159
Id. at § 20-871(b)(3).
160
GDPR rec. 1, 10, 71.
161
Elizabeth L. Feld, United States Data Privacy Law: The Domino Effect
after the GDPR, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 481, 489–96 (2020).
157
158
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information: . . . (h) the existence of
automated
decision-making,
including
profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4)
and, at least in those cases, meaningful
information about the logic involved, as
well as the significance and the envisaged
consequences of such processing for the
data subject. 162
In addition to this “right to know,” the GDPR also provides a
right to opt-out of automated decision-making. 163 The GDPR gives
further reasoning under Recital 71 and highlights employment as a
particular area in which automated decision-making may create
significant legal effects and where consumers’ rights must be protected
through transparency, consent, and the right to obtain human
intervention or review of an ADM’s processes. 164
2.

E.U. Artificial Intelligence Proposal

The European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Proposal (“AI
Proposal”), introduced in April 2021, builds on the rights provided to
consumers in the GDPR. The AI Proposal extends governing
mechanisms and accountability to all stages of production of AI
systems: testing, bringing AI systems to market, post-market
monitoring, and remediation of potential malfunctions and negatives
impacts. 165
The AI Proposal uses a risk classification scheme and defines
certain types or uses of AI systems as “high risk,” and therefore subject
to stricter regulation. Annex III of the AI Proposal classifies most types
of ADM systems that would be used both to support and to make
employment-related decisions as “high risk”:

GDPR art. 15(1)(h) (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 22(1) (“The data subject shall have the right not to be subject
to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects
him or her.”).
164
Id. at rec. 71 (“In any case, such processing should be subject to
suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data
subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point
of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment
and to challenge the decision.”).
165
E.U. AI Proposal art. 8–15.
162
163
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Employment, workers management and
access to self-employment:
(a)
AI systems intended to be used for
recruitment or selection of natural persons,
notably for advertising vacancies, screening
or filtering applications, evaluating candidates
in the course of interviews or tests;
(b)
AI intended to be used for making
decisions on promotion and termination of
work-related contractual relationships, for
task allocation and for monitoring and
evaluating performance and behavior of
persons in such relationships. 166
The Proposal justifies this classification by referencing the
significant impacts that such systems may have on people’s
livelihoods, their potential for the perpetuation of discrimination, and
the possibility that they may be used in a way that invades employee
privacy. It states:
AI systems used in employment, workers
management and access to self-employment,
notably for the recruitment and selection of
persons, for making decisions on promotion
and termination and for task allocation,
monitoring or evaluation of persons in workrelated contractual relationships, should also
be classified as high-risk, since those systems
may appreciably impact future career
prospects and livelihoods of these persons . . .
. Throughout the recruitment process and in
the evaluation, promotion, or retention of
persons
in
work-related
contractual
relationships, such systems may perpetuate
historical patterns of discrimination, for
example against women, certain age groups,
persons with disabilities, or persons of certain
racial or ethnic origins or sexual orientation.
AI systems used to monitor the performance
and behaviour of these persons may also

166

Id. at annex 3(4).
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impact their rights to data protection and
privacy. 167
As a result of this classification as “high-risk AI systems,” the
Proposal imposes restrictions on the development, marketing, and
management of the products. Software developers are held to
requirements including: (a) the establishment of a risk management
system, 168 (b) a data governance system to ensure that “[t]raining,
validation, and testing data shall be relevant, representative, free of
errors and complete,” 169 (c) technical documentation including general
characteristics of the system, and detailed descriptions of the systems
specifications and functioning, 170 (d) record-keeping systems that
include automated logs of decisions that the AI system makes, 171 (e)
transparency and provision of information to AI system users in order
to ensure that “operation is sufficiently transparent to enable users to
interpret the system’s output and use it appropriately,” 172 and (f)
building measures to ensure that the AI system can be “effectively
overseen by natural persons” while in use, including giving humans the
ability to override system outputs or stop system processes
altogether. 173
While the GDPR and the EU AI Proposal both provide
extensive protections and guidelines for consumers and employees
who may be affected by AI systems, they do not offer tailored solutions
that take into consideration the business considerations or existing laws
of the industries or practices they may be regulating. In the next
Section, this Article will look at ways to specifically tailor an approach
to AI and ADMs that is more appropriate for employees.
IV.

APPLYING DATA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES IN CONJUNCTION
WITH ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

Regulations and potential legislation aimed at monitoring,
ensuring fairness, and remediating the negative implications of ADM
systems for employment can take many forms. Primary among those
are tools to promote transparency, including various types of privacy
notices; principles that emphasize safe and fair systems during the
design stage; ongoing risk management measures; impact assessments;
Id. at rec. 36.
Id. at art. 9.
169
Id. at art. 10.
170
Id. at art. 11.
171
E.U. AI Proposal art. 12.
172
Id. at art. 13.
173
Id. at art. 14.
167
168
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accountability such as reports to government agencies, technical
documentation, and third-party audits; individual rights that allow optouts; human oversight of ADM systems; and requirements regarding
accuracy and fairness of systems with respect to potential disparate
impact discrimination. Frameworks built specifically for privacy,
which have been imported into proposed schemes for artificial
intelligence and ADM systems, however, do not necessarily fit,
especially when applied to the employment relationship. Some work
well for ADM systems, such as the necessity for transparency. Others,
such as opt-out schemes, undermine the very validity and benefits of
the AI or machine learning systems themselves.
As discussed previously, the United States has in place a
significant legal framework aimed at preventing unfair discrimination
based on characteristics such as race, sex, national origin, and age. This
framework, unfortunately, has lay dormant due to the invisibility of
these ADM “dark systems.” In order to effectively leverage the
existing anti-discrimination laws, we should first look to strengthen
requirements regarding notice and transparency. In addition, because
of the unique nature of ADM systems, it would also likely benefit
employees and applicants to require a threshold level of human
oversight and interaction, which would allow for better long-term
benefits from ADM systems and may mitigate their negative effects by
providing a faster and more efficient remedy as compared to litigation.
A.

Notice and Transparency Requirements for ADM
Systems
1.

Disclosure of the Use of ADM System to
Applicants and Employees

Systems for disclosure and notice may take many forms.
However, at this point in time, employees and applicants are currently
not entitled to any notice under federal law that they are being
monitored, evaluated, or scored based on ADM systems. If an
applicant applies for a job, and an employer utilizes an ATS to review
and score their resume, the applicant may be sorted to the lowest
category or assigned a specific score such that no human ever bothers
to review their application. Although the ADM may not be tasked with
making a final decision on a job application, it may make a de facto
determination simply through scoring, sorting, or issuing a
recommendation. 174
Without notice and disclosure of their use, employees and their
attorneys do not have adequate information to make an inference or
174

Citron, supra note 1, at 1271.
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form an opinion that they may have been subject to an adverse
employment action based on unfair or illegal criteria. 175 Thus,
antidiscrimination protections, such as those under Title VII or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), will likely not be
invoked. This is, unfortunately, consistent with the state of the system
that we have observed in the past. Although ADM systems have
proliferated in use, there has been little litigation, and thus little or no
chance for the systems to be reviewed and vetted by the public or in the
courts. 176
Disclosure of the use of such systems either at the time of their
use, or in conjunction with notification regarding an adverse
employment action, would have significant benefits.177 It would, as
noted above, give applicants, employees, and their attorneys fair notice
that a policy or practice was utilized that may have been the root cause
of disparate impact. If, for example, an applicant knows that they met
all of the requirements with respect to knowledge, skills, and abilities
associated with a job posting, possessing things such as the requisite
education and experience, then the disclosure that their application was
rejected by an ADM system may give rise to the inference that the
system is not functioning as intended, or that it has begun to make
inferences or correlations that reject candidates for unfair or
discriminatory reasons.
Likewise, because many issues of
discrimination and harassment have garnered media attention, and
because many companies often respond to public and media attention,
these types of disclosures may spur both more responsible use of ADM
systems by companies and increase the compliance efforts of
companies which design and market ADM systems for use in human
resources.

175
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
1265, 1271 (2020) (“Disclosure is the core mechanism of U.S. transparency
law, which enshrines values of public access to government decisionmaking.”); Citron, supra note 1, at 1249 (“Due process requires agencies to
provide individual notice and an opportunity to be heard . . . . This century’s
automated decision making systems combine individual adjudications with
rulemaking while adhering to the procedural safeguards of neither.”).
176
Successful challenges to algorithmic decision-making systems have
been made in the public sector, but those legal challenges have not been based
on discrimination or unfairness. Instead, they have focused on statutory and
constitutional procedural protections. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 175, at 1294.
177
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 20 (“[T]he underlying values of
due process - transparency, accuracy, accountability, participate, and fairness
- should animate the oversight of scoring systems given their profound impact
on people’s lives.”).
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Transparency also reinforces individual privacy rights. Notice
and consent typically support a defense against claims of common law
violations of invasion of privacy. 178 Transparency also forms a key
principle in data privacy regulations. 179 Requiring notice to applicants
and employees when their data is gathered and used as inputs by an
ADM to make an employment decision, while not providing the full
panoply of rights under legislation such as the GDPR, 180 would be a
significant step forward in enhancing privacy protections in the United
States.
2.

Disclosure of System Specifics

In addition to notice of their use, further disclosures regarding
ADM systems and their functionality would also benefit applicants and
employees. 181 Disclosures should first include the types of data used,
in other words, the inputs. As a baseline, notice of the specific inputs
used can be reviewed to ensure that the ADM systems are not
specifically taking into account legally-protected characteristics, but
they can also be used to determine the possible use of data that may act
as commonly-known proxies for protected characteristics, such as gaps
in tenure which may be a proxy for gender, or location of employees’
homes, which may be a proxy for race.
The specifics of the decisions or recommendations made by
the ADM systems, and whether those decisions are reviewed by
humans, should also be disclosed to applicants and employees.
Whether a system makes the autonomous decision to hire or fire an
employee, or merely creates a score or recommendation that is
subsequently reviewed or used as consideration when making the final
decision, is a critical piece of information. Sometimes, reviewers may
fall subject to automation bias, in which they reflexively agree with a
computer recommendation, or they assign too much weight to that
Matthew E. Swaya & Stacey R. Eisenstein, Emerging Technology in
the Workplace, 21 LAB. LAW. 1, 13 (2005).
179
Frank Hendrickx, Privacy 4.0 at Work: Regulating Employment,
Technology and Automation, 41 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 147, 161 (2019).
180
GDPR art. 13–15.
181
Some scholars argue that even robust disclosures, such as opening up
inspection of algorithmic code, is insufficient because it does not allow the
recipients to determine exactly how an individual decision was reached in their
case. See, e.g., Bloch-Wehba, supra note 175, at 1270. However, even if
initial disclosures about the use of ADMs are not determinative, disclosure
may be sufficient to provide applicants and employees with enough
information to form an inference of discrimination, which is often all that
many aggrieved parties have in cases of disparate impact discrimination prior
to litigation and the formal discovery process.
178
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recommendation due to their high degree of trust in the program. 182 In
other scenarios, however, ADM systems may be fully entrusted by
companies and employers to make the final decision on an employee’s
status. In both cases, the applicant or employee should be provided this
information, as it is a key component in understanding what the
potential impacts of the ADM system were on their particular case, and
if those impacts were potentially mitigated by human oversight.
Notices should also include a reasonable and appropriate
description of how the ADM system functions or arrives at its outputs
based on a given set of inputs. 183 The specifics and extent of such
disclosure merit some examination.184 Although this may be the most
challenging aspect of disclosure for employers or developers, it will
also likely be the most informative and useful information for the
applicants and employees. In the case of ADM systems that merely
conduct a statistical analysis or a comparison of straightforward data
sets, the requirement will not be difficult to meet. For example, a
company could state no more than, “The ADM system compares key
words found in your resume . . . to the words in the employer[’s] job
description and issues a percentage-based score reflecting the relative
match.” For more advanced ADM systems deploying machine
learning, however, the underlying difficulty is that such systems are
opaque, and human programmers may not be able to accurately
describe how a given system arrived at an output because they
themselves cannot adequately track the system’s correlations and logic.
This uncertainty is reflected in the current legislation and
Margot Kaminski & Jennifer M. Urban, The Right to Contest AI, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 1957, 1960–61 (2021).
183
See Kroll et al., supra note 131, at 634. Kroll et al. argues in favor of
technical solutions to the underlying issues of AI and discrimination. In so
doing, however, they place specific emphasis on transparency and procedural
regularity. Key to their proposal is that “these techniques can assure that
decisions are made with the key governance attribute of procedural regularity,
meaning that decisions are made under an announced set of rules consistently
applied in each case.” Id.
184
Such notice may depend on many factors, including the specific
employment decision being made. It is therefore difficult to conceptualize any
uniform or precise requirement. Even in areas that have addressed notice
issues for decades, such standards are flexible. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale,
supra note 1, at 27 (“Under the Due Process Clause, notice must be
‘reasonably calculated’ to inform individuals of the government’s claims
against them. The sufficiency of notice depends upon its ability to inform
affected individuals about the issues to be decided, the evidence supporting
the government’s decision, and the agency’s decisional process.”) (internal
citations omitted).
182
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proposals. New York City’s AI Ordinance, for example, requires
disclosure of the inputs, but does not require disclosure of the system
functionality.
The GDPR requires disclosure of “meaningful
information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and
the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.”185
Legislators appear trapped between the desire to provide specific and
meaningful information to data subjects, and the inability to know what
those pieces of information will be due to evolving technology and
machine learning black box problems. Given uncertainty both with
respect to how these systems will evolve in the future, as well as the
wide degree of approaches that they may currently use, the most
prudent current approach would be to craft a requirement that takes into
consideration the reasonableness of the disclosure and its relative
appropriateness for the use in question. 186 While this flexible standard
may not provide certainty to employers, it should encourage a high
degree of disclosure while also providing room for creative
development of different ADM systems in the future.
Lastly, companies should be required to disclose the specific
ADM system used, such as its name, model, and version number. This
information can be used as an easy reference point for applicants,
employees, litigants, and even the public to cross-reference and
determine whether certain systems are disproportionately identified as
being involved in unfair or illegal adverse employment actions. 187
3.

A Hypothetical Application and Comparison
with the FCRA

The risks of unfairness inherent in an employee background
check are analogous to those risks arising from ADM systems used for
employment purposes. Take for example a hypothetical applicant,
Leeloo, who applies for a job as a Senior Sales Representative at Zorg
Industries. Leeloo has years of experience as a sales representative,
and she meets all of the minimum and preferred qualifications for the
GDPR art. 15(1)(h).
One viable approach to the specific legislative language may be found
in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. When an individual is denied credit based
on a background or credit check, the FCRA requires the consumer be provided
with notice that includes “all relevant elements or reasons adversely affecting
the credit score for the particular individual, listed in the order of their
importance.” 15 U.S.C. §1681g(f)(2)(B).
187
Hannah Block-Wehba explores a number of algorithmic bias cases in
the public sector, and argues that the cases demonstrate an underlying
implication that the public has a right to know of the methodology which is
being deployed to rate and score them. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 175, at 1296,
1306–14.
185
186
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job with Zorg Industries. But the company’s Human Resources
Department is undermanned and has been ordered by its tyrannical
owner to terminate a million employees and slash hiring. To increase
the efficiency of its applicant screening process, it has instituted two
policies. First, it prescreens all job applicants based on a criminal
background check. Leeloo, unfortunately, shares a common name with
a different and unrelated Leeloo living in her county who has a recent
conviction for armed robbery and murder. Second, Zorg Industries
uses a new recruiting software product which uses automated decisionmaking to compare applicants’ resumes based on similarity of language
and keywords as compared to the Senior Sales Representative job
description. The written job description, however, uses many words
that contain gender-specific connotations, including such descriptors
as “proven leader,” “aggressive salesperson,” and “doesn’t take no for
an answer.”
Zorg’s background check process and ADM software,
unencumbered by legal restriction, would likely screen out Leeloo
from employment prior to an interview or a human review of her
resume. But, under current law, Leeloo is protected by the FCRA.
Zorg Industries would have to provide a notice and disclosure of its
intent to use a background check, and it would be required to provide
a pre-adverse action notice containing a copy of the background check
with the erroneous reports for aggravated robbery and murder. The
innocent Leeloo would then have a “reasonable time” to correct the
record by demonstrating that she has no pending criminal charges
against her. 188
With respect to the use of the new recruiting software,
however, Zorg Industries would have no current legal obligation under
federal law to inform Leeloo of the reasons for declining her
application or the fact that an ADM system was even used to evaluate
her resume and ultimately decide her fate. If she were provided such
information and an opportunity to object to the decision, Leeloo could
establish simply by referral to her resume that she met the
qualifications of the job. Under existing antidiscrimination laws, such
as Title VII, Leeloo could establish a prima facie case of disparate

Presented with such evidence, a credit reporting agency that failed to
correct an erroneous background check report could be held liable under the
FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (“Whenever a consumer reporting agency
prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual
about whom the report relates.”).
188
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treatment discrimination for failure to hire. 189 Zorg Industries,
however, would likely be able to defeat a claim for disparate treatment
by demonstrating that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the rejection of Leeloo’s application through demonstration that the
ADM software made the decision without reference to her protected
class. 190
Instead, the stronger legal claim by Leeloo would be for
disparate impact discrimination. A disparate impact claim would
require that she establish the particular employment practice, in this
case the ADM system, declined her resume because of her membership
in a protected class. 191 Usually, such a claim could be supported by
statistical evidence. 192 If Leeloo is provided with notice and
disclosures regarding the ADM systems involvement in declining her
application, she may draw an inference of discrimination and raise a
complaint with Zorg’s Human Resources Department. Even if she
does not have statistical evidence, Zorg Industries will have access to
the underlying data for job applicants in the recruiting process, and it
could likely determine even at this early stage of the complaint process
that the use of the ADM software was having a disparate impact on
protected classes of applicants. But if even the company did not have
the early advantage of a statistical analysis, the Human Resources
Department or hiring managers could review Leeloo’s resume and
determine she possessed the necessary qualifications. This would raise
an inference that the ADM software made a decision based on
something that may not qualify as a bona fide factor other than sex or

A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a
failure to hire case by offering evidence that: (a) the plaintiff belongs to a
protected class, (b) the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants, (c) plaintiff was rejected despite
his or her qualifications, and (d) the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 798, 802 (1973).
190
If an employee presents evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a “legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Texas Dept. of Comm.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981).
191
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
192
“A prima facie case of disparate impact is usually accomplished by
statistical evidence showing that an employment practice selects members of
a protected class in a proportion smaller than their percentage in the pool of
actual applicants.” Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002).
189
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race. 193 Zorg Industries would then have several options, including
passing Leeloo on to the next stage of the selection process and
beginning an internal audit of the ADM software.
The FCRA adverse action process provides a model for what
should be adopted when automated decision-making systems are
employed for purposes of adverse action decisions in the employment
context. Like third-party background checks, ADM systems have
quickly become part of an elaborate and often opaque system of
employee and applicant evaluations, and much like the historical credit
reporting practices in place prior to the passage of the FCRA,
employees and applicants who are subject to these systems currently
have no legal right to receive notice of the basis of those decisions or
to dispute their accuracy or fairness. Providing such rights would
increase transparency into ADM systems and their potential misuse,
and the ability to object to inaccurate and unfair preliminary decisions
would raise the likelihood that employers would correct them before
they can be made final.
4.

Benefits of Transparency

There are numerous benefits to transparency for ADM systems
used for employment purposes. First, transparency provides the
requisite information for individuals to know whether they might have
a legal claim for disparate impact discrimination, which is currently
lacking. 194 Although basic notifications may not provide information
such as relative selection rate or statistical effects on various protected
categories, and such a requirement would likely prove infeasible,
notice may still provide an ability for potential plaintiffs to understand
that an ADM system may have influenced their hiring or firing. From
193
The California Equal Pay Act bars employers from disparate wages
rates except where the employer demonstrates the wage differential is based
upon a seniority system, a merit system, a system that measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production, or a “bona fide factor other than sex, such
as education, training, or experience.” CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(a) (West
2022).
194
Citron, supra note 1, at 1281–82 (stating that, with respect to
governmental due process, “Automated decision systems endanger the basic
right to be given notice of an agency’s intended actions. This right requires
that notice be ‘reasonably calculated’ to inform individuals of the
government’s claims. The sufficiency of notice depends upon its ability to
inform affected individuals about the issues to be decided, the evidence
supporting the government’s position, and the agency’s decisional process.
Clear notice decreases the likelihood that agency action will rest upon
‘incorrect or misleading factual premises or on the misapplication of rules.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
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that point, the individual may have enough information to form an
inference of discrimination if, for example, they know that they were
qualified for the job in question, or if they know they were performing
their job commensurately with other employees that were not
terminated in the case of an ADM system that judges work
performance. 195 Gathering further information and discovery on the
ADM system’s impacts on applicants or employees can then be
accomplished through litigation, which is best suited to such a purpose.
Second, even when not leading to litigation, a system of
disclosure will allow applicants and employees the right to contest a
decision early and efficiently. Take, for example, the earlier example
of Leeloo’s application to Zorg Industries, and the legal model of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act. By providing notice to applicants like
Leeloo that an ADM system has made or contributed to an adverse
employment decision, and by granting them a limited window to
request a human review of the decision, Zorg Industries and companies
like it will be forced to explain and be held immediately accountable
for their use of ADM systems. Flaws may be discovered sooner, and
applicants, employees, and employers could avoid costly and
prolonged litigation by fixing issues earlier.
Lastly, transparency with respect to ADM systems’
functionality will likely foster the development of explainable AI, or
XAI. True black box systems whose outputs cannot be explained will
be deterred from participation in the market if employers and software
designers cannot meet the legal requirements associated with
deploying them for use in the real world. Systems which can process
input and meaningfully explain outputs should find higher adoption.
This, in turn, will promote investment and development in such
systems, and should benefit both employers and employees in the long
run.
5.

What Early Opt-Out Systems, such as the
New York Ordinance, Get Wrong

Kroll et al. acknowledge that “full or partial transparency can be a
helpful tool for governance,” but they also argue that transparency is not
sufficient to provide accountability. Kroll et al., supra note 131, at 657–58.
A primary contention that they make is that full transparency of computer code
as well as key inputs and outputs may lead to individuals gaming the
algorithms. Id. at 658. This argument may be persuasive for AI used fraud or
tax evasion, but it does not appear well-suited to employment scenarios in
which employees and job applicants have a legitimate expectation in
understanding the standards judging their job performance.
195
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Assuming that applicants and employees receive timely notice
of the use of an ADM system to evaluate them or make an adverse
action decision, an alternative approach is to allow the employees to
opt out of the ADM process altogether. This, for example, is the
approach that the New York AI Ordinance has taken, and the approach
that data privacy regimes provide to consumers when they do not wish
their personal data to be processed by automated means or through
profiling. Allowing an early opt-out option for employees, however, is
a mistake.
First, allowing early employee opt-outs will likely corrupt the
integrity of the data upon which these systems rely for their
performance and improvement. 196 In the case of an applicant tracking
system, if a large group of applicants opts out due to selection bias and
mistrust of AI or ML systems, removal of that group and their
corresponding characteristics may skew the data for the remaining
population. Where a legal analysis may be done later for auditing,
internal evaluation of the system’s performance, or due to litigation,
the remaining data will not tell the full story of how those applicants
would have been evaluated or how the ADM system would have
treated them.
Second, machine learning systems, when programmed and
utilized correctly, improve with successive iterations, learning and
fine-tuning mistakes through trial and error. Again, if a specific and
self-selected population removes itself through an opt-out mechanism,
a ML system may never learn to properly assess their characteristics or
Joseph W. Sakshaug, Alexandra Schmucker, Frauke Kreuter, Mick P.
Couper & Eleanor Singer, Evaluating Active (Opt-In) and Passive (Opt-Out)
Consent Bias in the Transfer of Federal Contact Data to a Third-Party Survey
Agency, 4 J. SURV. STAT. & METHODOLOGY 382, 386, 402–03 (2014) (finding
that opt-in and opt-outs increase selection bias and decrease sample size, with
opt-ins having the greater detrimental effect on selection bias); EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS,
OPPORTUNITY,
AND
CIVIL
RIGHTS
8
(May
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/201
6_0504_data_discrimination.pdf (noting that selection bias may occur in the
inputs for algorithms “where the set of data inputs to a model is not
representative of a population and thereby results in conclusions that could
favor certain groups over others.”); Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic
Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1402–03
(2019) (“Oftentimes, the data fed to algorithms suffer from a self-selection
problem.”); Bent, supra note 12, at 812 (“If, for example, data are more readily
available for men than women, or for younger applicants than older applicants,
the algorithm may unintentionally disfavor the underrepresented group due to
the data’s inaccurate reflection of the relevant population.”).
196
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performance. The systems cannot learn from absent data. On the other
hand, if given the chance to evaluate the data of the employees or
applicants, make a decision based on the available data, and then have
that decision reviewed and corrected by human oversight, an ADM
system may be able to learn from and improve on its mistakes in the
future.
B.

Forms and Benefits of Human Oversight

AI and machine learning systems work most effectively when
paired with the innate abilities of humans. Remember, for example,
that AI systems are typically poor at basic human activities, tasks such
as perception of the real world, intuition, common sense, reasoning by
analogy, and transfer learning. AI and machine learning, however,
have capacities that go far beyond human abilities for understanding
and processing large amounts of data. Human oversight, therefore, can
work in conjunction with notice and transparency obligations. 197
Human oversight, or a “human in the loop,” can take many
forms. As discussed previously, invocation of human review prior to
the ADM system making an adverse employment decision is not the
optimal approach. When employees and applicants have been subject
to an adverse action, and they are subsequently provided with notice
and the right to request human review of that decision, human oversight
may have the benefit of remedying an unjust or inaccurate decision
soon after it is made, and without the need for litigation.
Human oversight may also be utilized for the ongoing
monitoring, review, and correction of ADM systems during their
performance. This is the approach taken by the EU Artificial
Intelligence Proposal, which requires ongoing monitoring by humans
of the processes and results of a high-risk AI system, as well as human
ability to stop such systems. The proposal states:
High-risk AI systems should be designed and
developed in such a way that natural persons
can oversee their functioning. For this
purpose, appropriate human oversight
measures should be identified by the provider
of the system before its placing on the market
or putting into service. In particular, where
appropriate, such measures should guarantee
that the system is subject to in-built
Kroll et al., supra note 131, at 639 (“That is, while transparency of a
rule makes reviewing the basis of decisions more possible, it is not a substitute
for individualized review of particular decisions.”).
197
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operational constraints that cannot be
overridden by the system itself and is
responsive to the human operator, and that the
natural persons to whom human oversight has
been assigned have the necessary competence,
training and authority to carry out that role. 198
The rationale for this approach, as outlined by the Independent
High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence set up by the
European Commission, is that AI should respect human autonomy and
should be designed to work in conjunction with humans instead of
being designed to replace them. The group states:
The fundamental rights upon which the EU is
founded are directed towards ensuring respect
for the freedom and autonomy of human
beings. Humans interacting with AI systems
must be able to keep full and effective selfdetermination over themselves, and be able to
partake in the democratic process. AI systems
should not unjustifiably subordinate, coerce,
deceive, manipulate, condition or herd
humans. Instead, they should be designed to
augment, complement and empower
human cognitive, social and cultural skills.
The allocation of functions between
humans and AI systems should follow
human-centric design principles and leave
meaningful opportunity for human choice.
This means securing human oversight over
work processes in AI systems. AI systems
may also fundamentally change the work
sphere. It should support humans in the
working environment, and aim for the creation
of meaningful work. 199
ADM systems may significantly benefit from human
oversight, and systems built with human-centric designs may be more
E.U. AI Proposal rec. 48.
INDEPENDENT HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTWORTHY AI 12, 14 (2019)
(emphasis
added),
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/library/ethicsguidelines-trustworthy-ai.
198
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fair and may outperform alternative systems without such safeguards.
As we have seen, current artificial intelligence and machine learning
systems lack capacities such as basic common sense and the ability to
reason by analogy. They cannot always independently identify their
own errors, such as when they draw a discriminatory inference about
employees. Many companies have discovered systematic issues of
discrimination after trialing such programs, but these investigations
require competent human review. This is consistent with the trend
observed by most artificial intelligence researchers: current AI
technology and humans tend to complement each other. Perhaps at
some point in the future these trends will change. AI may surpass
humanity at the ability to perceive and reason about our everyday
world, and it may be that general AI systems will eventually be able to
effectively oversee more specialized systems. Until that time arrives,
requiring human oversight of ADM systems will be the best approach
to ensuring such systems continue to comport with our ideals of
fairness.
C.

Independent Audits

Independent audits like those required by the New York
Ordinance, while well-intentioned, are unlikely to be effective. A
threshold question arises of how such audits will be practically
conducted. As demonstrated by many artificial intelligence and
machine learning systems, a fundamental difficulty arises when
moving from the learning stages to application to real-world data. This
transition exposes the systems to unexpected scenarios and edge cases,
often referred to as “long-tail” problems because when plotted on a
distribution such scenarios are not often seen except in the “long-tail”
of large sets of data. 200 Audits conducted without the benefit of this
real-world data likely will not be able to predict or detect the actual
problems that the ADM systems will encounter once actually
deployed. 201 “Testing of any kind is . . . a fundamentally limited
approach to determining whether any fact about a computer system is
true or untrue.” 202

MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 100–02.
Kroll et al., supra note 131, at 651 (“Even structured ‘audits’ of
software systems, in which systems are provided with related inputs and
analyzed for differential behavior, cannot provide complete coverage of a
program's behavior for the same reason: this methodology explains little about
what happens to inputs which have not been tested, even those that differ very
slightly.”).
202
Id. at 652.
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We must also question the realistic chances for the impartiality
and independence of such audits. Without sufficient constraints and
guidelines, audits may unfortunately be used in a self-serving manner
by the developers to justify their own programs. In January 2021,
HireVue made dual announcements in a public statement, announcing
that it would no longer use its facial analysis algorithms as part of its
applicant assessments, while also releasing a copy of an audit from
Cathy O’Neil’s organization, ORCAA, which HireVue implied
demonstrated a lack of bias in its product. 203 At the time, HireVue
stated, “The audit concluded that ‘[HireVue] assessments work as
advertised with regard to fairness and bias issues.’” An independent
reviewer, however, concluded that HireVue misrepresented its
findings, and ORCAA did not comment on the matter. 204 Of particular
concern, HireVue provided a link to the ORCAA report, but required
anyone who accessed it to pledge not to publicly disclose its
contents. 205 HireVue’s actions in this case potentially raise serious
implications about companies using an audit for justification of
potentially biased and unfair principles, mischaracterizing that AI audit
for their own commercial purposes, and also insulating the actual
contents of the audit from public review and discussion.
This is not an isolated problem. Alex Engler writes,
“HireVue’s shady behavior encapsulates the challenges facing the
emerging market for algorithmic audits. While the concept sounds
similar to well-established auditing practices such as financial
accounting and tax compliance, algorithmic auditing lacks the
necessary incentives to function as a check on AI applications.” 206
Current legislation regarding these audits suffers from a lack of
specificity, which compounds the problem that such audits will not be
fairly or impartially conducted. For example, the New York Ordinance
simply requires employers to conduct a bias audit, which it defines as
203

HireVue leads the industry with commitment to transparent and ethical
use of AI in hiring, HIREVUE (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.hirevue.com/pressrelease/hirevue-leads-the-industry-with-commitment-to-transparent-andethical-use-of-ai-in-hiring.
204
Engler, supra note 6.
205
As of the time of this writing, the report is available online at
https://www.hirevue.com/resources/template/orcaa-report. In order to
access or download it, a user must agree to the following statement: “By
downloading this document you acknowledge and agree this report is the sole
and exclusive intellectual property of HireVue, Inc., and you agree you shall
not use, copy, excerpt, reproduce, distribute, display, publish, etc. the contents
of this report in whole, or in part, for any purpose not expressly authorized in
writing by HireVue, Inc.”
206
Engler, supra note 6.
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“an impartial evaluation by an independent auditor. Such bias audit
shall include but not be limited to the testing of an automated
employment decision tool to assess the tool’s disparate impact on
persons” based on their protected characteristics. 207 The Ordinance
says nothing about the characteristics of the auditor, such as required
expertise or certification. It does not describe the means by which a
bias audit should be conducted, including the applicable statistical
analysis or even what might constitute a disparate impact.
Lastly, where the auditors are paid by the software developers
for their work, they may have little incentive to be critical of their
clients’ programs. Although a significant portion of the audit may
entail a mathematical or statistical analysis, there are numerous
subjective decisions to be made that can influence the outcomes. For
example, the basic choice of whether to evaluate a program based on a
four-fifths rule or a standard deviation analysis will often be
determinative based on factors such as the size of the employer and the
pool of data. 208 An auditor may therefore be motivated to produce a
favorable audit, and this danger is heightened by the regulatory
uncertainty regarding the audit requirements and the current low
likelihood of enforcement proceedings against customers. 209
D.

Why Regulate ADM Systems At All: The Market
Approach Alternative

Some may question the necessity for regulating artificial
intelligence or ADM systems at all. The benefits of efficiency and even
potential non-discrimination may arguably outweigh the costs. Cathy
O’Neil, in Weapons of Math Destruction, discusses this argument and
juxtaposes it with the case of regulation of sexual orientation as a
protected characteristic for employment purposes. 210 In the late 1990s,
when President Bill Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”), there was an outpouring of corporate support in favor of
the rights of the LGBT community. Many large corporations made
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 20-870.
Peresie, supra note 123, at 783.
209
Some scholars have argued that independent audits are necessary in
order to remediate potential bias and discrimination. Ajunwa, supra note 3, at
664–65. Audits may suffer from a lack of adequate data to determine
discrimination since applicants and employees are requested, but not required,
to provide their demographic information. Professor Ajunwa argues that such
information should be legally required of applicants. Id. However, this
solution only deepens the potential privacy violations and the risks of a
cybersecurity breach that exposes applicants and employees’ sensitive data.
210
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 200–02.
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public statements and publicized policies pledging that they would not
discriminate against applicants or employees based on their sexual
orientation, despite no legal obligation to do so. From this, detractors
of government regulation may argue or conclude that laws requiring
fair and equal treatment of employees based on their protected
categories have simply outlived their usefulness.
In the case of sexual orientation, however, corporations did not
simply do the right thing out of their public interest, but because of
their own economic motivations. Non-discrimination policies related
to sexual orientation allow those corporations to compete more
effectively for talent, and especially for talent from members of the
LGBT community. Conversely, the companies at the time making
such public statements and promises had little or nothing to gain from
sexual orientation discrimination, and many therefore voluntarily
promoted policies of equality. 211
The situation here is strikingly different. ADM systems
promote efficiency and earn companies’ money. Employers have little
or no interest in self-regulating such systems and turning back the clock
to have armies of recruiters and sourcers hired to sort through stack
upon stack of applicant resumes. 212 Likewise, they have no interest in
transparency or disclosing the basis of their decisions when such
practices could subject them to claims of disparate impact
discrimination.
ADMs also have a tendency toward self-fulfilling feedback
loops which may reinforce employers’ use and reliance on biased
data. 213 If initially programming an ADM using training data from a
historically non-diverse workforce, an employer then continues to
discriminate in hiring and promotions, and may continue to train
successive iterations of ADM systems on the newly updated, but still
biased, data. Without proper regulatory protections, there are few
economic incentives for employers to remedy the flaws in these
systems. It is therefore incumbent upon legislators to require such
disclosures and put in place regulations for the benefit of the applicants
and employees.
V.

CONCLUSION

Our regulation and relationship to AI, machine learning, and
any other type of automated decision-making system in employment
211

Id.
Kim, supra note 6, at 894 (“So long as the algorithm is accurate enough
to make the employer’s process less costly, neither the employer nor the
vendor will have sufficient incentive to identify and remove the bias.”).
213
Id. at 895–96.
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ultimately depends on our perceptions of the usefulness of such
products and their relative costs. This should, by many accounts, be a
straightforward analysis, analogous to many other cost-benefit
analyses that we undertake both overtly and implicitly when weighing
regulations for other products and services. We calculate the benefits
of mass transportation through automobiles, and weigh those against
the relative costs of air pollution, noise pollution, depletion of raw
materials, and traffic fatalities. We weigh the benefits of the
alternative, riding on horses, and the costs of housing, feeding, tidying
up after the horse’s natural processes, and potentially being bitten or
kicked when the horse has a bad day. We choose cars.
As compared to other technologies, however, artificial
intelligence triggers a unique and more visceral reaction. The very
term is often euphemized to seem more benign to the audience, with
speakers deploying terms such as machine learning, neural networks,
or even in this article, “automated decision-making.” Western culture
has a particular fear and fascination with humanity, collectively or
individually, being supplanted by machines. Perhaps, in some ways,
this is not unfounded. We have seen shifts in our society away from
an agrarian economy, and then again away from factory and production
work, as the result of advances in technological capacity. This third
revolution of information technology, which has only begun, has
changed the day-to-day work of nearly everyone on the planet. As the
saying goes, however, change is not necessarily bad. Access to a
worldwide database of information, to our friends and family through
smart phone video calls, and to the tools of work productivity likely
outweigh the costs of having to address disinformation campaigns on
social media and constantly being forced to hang up on spambot calls.
The costs of artificial intelligence, however, seem to strike deeper.
People believe the machines will want to, at best, replace us, and at
worst to destroy us. The chorus of regulations emerging reflect this,
emphasizing that humans continually be kept in the loop of AI systems,
beginning at the point of inception, and that those humans have the
ability to shut down the AI if it somehow runs amok.
Some of these fears are likely misplaced. Software programs
do what they are told. They have no inherent beliefs, desires, or
emotions. While programs like Deep Blue, IBM’s Watson, and
AlphaGo conquered the world’s best human competitors in games such
as chess, Jeopardy, and Go, the AI systems responsible for such feats
of prowess obtained no satisfaction from their victories. They had no
pride. They did not even know that they were beating humans.
Artificial intelligence software does what it is programmed to do, often
in incredibly narrow and rationalist terms, and it should in the future
have no animosity towards humans unless those same humans intend
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it to. Writers like Nick Bostrom may speculate that, given their limited
common sense and real-world understanding, such systems could
inadvertently run amok even without intent. He gives the example of
an AI system programmed to produce as many paper clips as possible,
and which begins to consume all the natural resources of earth
(including its humans) to do so, only to turn to the stars and other
planets to produce yet more paper clips once the earth is exhausted. 214
While thought-provoking, the hypothetical seems conceptually
impossible. Such an artificial intelligence system would have to
progress to a relative superintelligence, capable of overcoming all other
competing AI systems and world defenses, while simultaneously
remaining blithely unaware of the real-world implications, costs, and
morality of its actions. 215 Accordingly, the warning story seems better
fare for a children’s parable than a serious building block for discussion
of whether and how to address the costs and benefits of such important
technology.
Some of these ideas may stem from Western religious and
philosophical ideas about the transcendence of the human soul above
the physical world and the human body, which may be reframed as an
inherent conflict between mankind against soulless machines.216 The
metanarratives of eventual conflict and replacement by artificial
intelligence or smart machines are not, however, universal. If we look
at Japanese ideas about the relationship between artificial intelligence
and humanity, we see that perceptions are shaped by traditional
religious ideas such as Buddhism and animism, which focus on the
positive interconnections between nature, mankind, and our man-made
creations. Animistic principles imply that artificial intelligences may
have a spirit or soul. Thus, humans and machines are not
fundamentally different, and are not inevitably headed toward conflict.
As a result, narratives regarding the eventual fate of AI and man do not
center around conflict and replacement, but the constructive
relationship possible between the two. 217
Putting irrational fears aside, current technology does have
significant problems. Dark systems, such as those which may invisibly
perpetuate bias and historical discrimination, should be addressed. But
while the current state and near-future vulnerabilities and uses of ADM
systems do merit close scrutiny and regulation, regulators and society
should temper the inherent impulse to overreact and overregulate.
NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES
123 (2014).
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While technology-neutral laws that can be applied across all industries
may be tempting, they may also not be possible or desirable with
respect to technology whose trajectory we cannot accurately predict in
the long-term, or where we have existing legal frameworks that have
been tailored to meet a specific purpose, such as combating
employment discrimination.

